The disclosure of the secret meeting of senior US and Israeli military commanders with their counterparts from seven Arab countries in Germany cannot be viewed simply as a routine security gathering. CENTCOM has confirmed that the meeting took place, but before the participating countries officially announced it, Axios reported on it, citing Israeli officials. The manner in which the meeting was disclosed, together with its unprecedented lineup of participants, raises questions about its political and media purpose and function.

A New Alliance or a Display of an Existing One?

At first glance, the German meeting could be seen as evidence of the formation of a new regional alliance. However, a significant part of this cooperation is not new. The United States and some Arab countries have worked together for years within various security frameworks, while cooperation between Israel and some Arab governments has expanded following the Abraham Accords.

What matters more in this meeting, therefore, is not the “creation of a new alliance,” but the public display of an existing security alignment at the current stage of the war. In practical terms, there may have been no new operational development on the ground. Yet an image has now emerged of Israel’s military chief sitting alongside the commanders of the armed forces of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, as well as the commander of CENTCOM. That image itself can carry an independent political message.

US and Israel Need an Achievement to Present

The timing of the disclosure is also important. The United States is approaching the congressional midterm elections, while Israel is scheduled to hold elections on October 27. Donald Trump has said the end of the Iran war will be postponed until after the elections, while JD Vance has spoken of the war entering “a different phase” after the elections.

Under these circumstances, and given that achieving victory through war has become an unattainable objective for the United States, alliance-building itself can become a political achievement, even if it does not produce a decisive operational change.

The issue is even more sensitive for Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu is running for another term as prime minister on October 27, and Reuters has reported on political pressure on his coalition and concerns about an electoral defeat, concerns supported by most polls.

A Message to Arab Countries: “You Are Not Alone”

The image also has political and psychological value for Arab countries. Saudi Arabia is facing threats from Ansarullah after previously seeking direct US action against Yemen, while Washington has avoided a broader intervention in the conflict.

At the same time, Riyadh’s defense cooperation with countries such as Pakistan and Turkey does not necessarily mean that they will enter the Yemen war. The presence of Arab commanders alongside CENTCOM and Israel’s military chief can therefore convey at least one reassuring message: there is broader security and military backing against regional threats.

This message is important for Arab governments, even if it does not yet mean the creation of an entirely new operational capability.

Hormuz: Point That Challenges the American Narrative

Perhaps the most important contradiction, however, lies in the issue of Hormuz itself. In recent weeks, the United States has sought to project an image of a gradual return to normal conditions in the Strait of Hormuz. Trump even said in late August that “the Strait is open,” while Axios reported on the US government’s view that Iran’s leverage in Hormuz was declining.

Yet the CENTCOM commander is now bringing together the commanders of eight countries at a meeting where, according to Axios, one of the topics was a plan to increase vessel traffic through Hormuz. Axios has also reported that the United States continues to facilitate the passage of ships and that oil flows remain far below prewar levels.

These two images do not easily fit together: if conditions in Hormuz have returned to normal, why is military coordination among several countries needed to increase vessel traffic?

It Is Not Just About Hormuz; It Is About the Cost Being Passed to the Market

Iran’s strategy of increasing the cost for the besieger, together with Ansarullah’s pressure on Bab el-Mandeb, can affect markets through higher shipping and insurance risks and tanker rates, even without a complete halt to all maritime routes.

This is a war that is taking place partly on the military battlefield and partly in market perceptions. If a shipping company, insurer or oil buyer believes that passage through a particular route has become riskier, that risk will be factored into the price.

For the United States, this issue is directly connected to the domestic economy. The US average diesel price surpassed $6 per gallon for the first time on September 10, while Brent crude also traded above $100 a barrel. Reuters has described the rise in fuel prices as a factor intensifying inflationary pressures and a political challenge for the Trump administration and Republicans ahead of the elections.

At the same time, higher energy prices and inflation concerns have spilled over into the Treasury market. The yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds has approached 5% in recent days, while US debt has surpassed $40 trillion.

The United States is therefore facing more than a military problem. Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb can transmit the cost of war into the US economy through energy, transportation, inflation and the bond market.

Is Alliance Display Intended to Contain the Psychological Impact of the War?

From this perspective, the disclosure of the German meeting could serve another purpose: sending a message to global markets that Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb can be managed within a broader security architecture.

The simultaneous presence of the United States, Israel and Arab countries could be designed to reduce the psychological impact of actions by Iran and Ansarullah, in other words, to rebuild confidence in the security of maritime routes even as significant operational problems along those routes remain and have even intensified.

Yet this very move creates another contradiction: the more Washington needs to demonstrate an alliance to prove that it controls Hormuz, the more the question arises as to why such an alliance is needed at all for an issue that had previously been described as “normal.”

Israel: A Strength or a New Risk?

Israel’s presence could be the most important element of this equation. If Israel’s role in this arrangement remains limited to security, intelligence and defense coordination, it can be viewed as part of the display of a new regional security architecture. But if it extends to any level of operational participation in Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, or attacks on Iran and Yemen, Israel will once again become more directly involved in the conflict.

In that case, Iran and Ansarullah could also regard Israel not merely as a coordinating member, but as a direct party to the conflict, and adjust the level of their response accordingly.

This scenario carries costs for Netanyahu ahead of the October 27 elections. On one side is the opportunity to project an image of a “regional alliance and security power”; on the other is the possibility of reopening direct fronts and increasing threats against Israel just weeks before the election.

German Meeting Is More Than a Military Meeting

The German meeting should not be explained simply by saying that “an alliance has been formed against changes to the existing balance in the region.” A significant part of this cooperation already existed. The meeting’s real significance lies in its timing, composition, manner of disclosure and message.

The United States and Israel need an achievement to present domestically; Arab countries need a display of security backing; global markets need reassurance about the security of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb; and Washington wants to neutralize the psychological impact of rising risks to maritime shipping.

Yet there is a paradox at the heart of this effort: an alliance intended to send a message of “control over the situation” could itself be a sign that the situation is not yet as normal as it is being portrayed.

More importantly, if this display moves beyond imagery and coordination into Israeli operational participation, it could increase the scope of the conflict rather than reduce the risk.

The secret German meeting may be less about launching a new alliance than about an attempt to manage the costs of war: on the battlefield, in the market and in public opinion. The prospects for success in balancing the US need to project control, Arab countries’ need for security guarantees and Israel’s need for an electoral achievement remain highly uncertain.