Nournews: A recent report by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz about Mohammed bin Zayed’s warning to Benjamin Netanyahu roughly 10 days before the October 7 operation has once again shed light on the security ties between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv. Although the Israeli prime minister’s office has denied the report, the UAE’s response, rather than issuing an outright denial, emphasized the existence of direct communication channels between officials on both sides and the sharing of information when necessary.

According to Haaretz, bin Zayed warned Netanyahu in a conversation about the possibility of a major operation by Hamas and even mentioned the name of Yahya Sinwar. Netanyahu’s office rejected the account. The UAE, meanwhile, said it does not comment on media reports or speculation regarding conversations between national leaders, while at the same time confirming that open and direct communication channels exist between the two sides.

Regardless of whether the details reported by Haaretz are accurate, this response raises an important question: If Abu Dhabi was aware of the possibility of a major Palestinian operation, why was Israel the recipient of that information?

If the report is accurate, the decision to direct the warning to Israel suggests that Israel’s security was part of Abu Dhabi’s security calculations.

This issue cannot be separated from the evolution of UAE-Israel relations. The Abraham Accords transformed ties between the two sides from a limited and largely behind-the-scenes relationship into a formal and wide-ranging partnership—one that extends beyond economics and trade to security and defense.

Within this framework, if intelligence was indeed shared ahead of October 7, it could be viewed as evidence of a level of intelligence cooperation that goes beyond conventional diplomatic relations.

But the significance of this issue for Iran becomes apparent at the next stage.

The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran is not merely a confrontation between Tehran and Washington or Tel Aviv. It has also put the region’s emerging security architecture to the test. The UAE is, on the one hand, a neighbor of Iran and one of the key countries on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf. On the other, it has in recent years become one of the United States and Israel’s closest security partners in the region.

During the ongoing war, documented reports have emerged about the deployment or transfer of Israeli air-defense systems to the UAE to counter Iranian attacks. Combined with the U.S. military presence in the region and Abu Dhabi’s longstanding defense cooperation with Washington, these developments indicate that the UAE has acquired a special position within the U.S.-Israeli security architecture in the Persian Gulf.

From this perspective, understanding Abu Dhabi’s position requires looking beyond its official statements about having “no desire to expand the war.” Its security partners, intelligence channels, and shared interests must also be taken into account.

The report about bin Zayed’s warning to Netanyahu raises a serious question: Has the UAE defined itself as independent of Israel in confronting the resistance movement, or has it developed shared security interests with Tel Aviv?

In light of the trajectory of UAE-Israel relations since the Abraham Accords, the answer is not particularly difficult. The UAE and Israel have developed shared interests, at least in some areas, in containing resistance movements and preventing shifts in the region’s security balance.

This can also help explain Abu Dhabi’s conduct during the war with Iran. In addition to its security and intelligence cooperation with Israel and the United States, the UAE has, according to several documented reports, assisted Israel and Washington’s military aggression against Iran through direct participation in military operations.

If the reported pre-October 7 warning is considered alongside the history of UAE-Israel security cooperation and recent defense developments, the possibility of close intelligence and security coordination can no longer be dismissed as a marginal issue.

Under the complex circumstances prevailing in the region, the issue is not merely what bin Zayed knew on the eve of October 7 or what he told Netanyahu. The more important question is which side the UAE has chosen to align its interests with within the region’s emerging security architecture.

Abu Dhabi may officially present itself as neutral in the war with Iran. But in foreign policy, a country’s position is determined by more than official statements. Its security networks, intelligence partners, and strategic choices are also part of the answer.

From the UAE’s warning to Netanyahu ahead of October 7 to intelligence and military cooperation during the war with Iran, the question is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid: On which side of the Persian Gulf is the UAE really standing?