Nournews: The U.S. naval blockade was intended to target Iran’s economic resilience by cutting off or restricting its export routes. Developments in recent days, however—particularly the escalation of clashes last night—have revealed signs that the equation may be reversing.

The exchange of attacks between Iran and the United States on oil tankers and military vessels, Iran’s missile strike on a U.S. base in Jordan, and the sharp decline in traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with soaring oil and petroleum-product prices, suggest that the costs of the blockade are no longer being borne by Iran alone.

A few days earlier, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, announced Tehran’s new strategy, including the establishment of a new restricted zone in the Persian Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz. The zone begins at the U.S. forces’ blockade line, and vessels entering it could face inclusion on Iran’s sanctions list.

The significance of this strategy lies not merely in creating a “restricted zone,” but in changing the logic of confronting a blockade. Just as the United States targets vessels, companies and transportation networks in an effort to pressure Iranian exports, Tehran has signaled that it, too, can target the behavior of the very networks involved.

The arena of confrontation, therefore, is no longer confined to the Strait of Hormuz itself. It is expanding to the broader network of ships, companies and logistical routes involved in passing through Hormuz, transporting energy and circumventing restrictions.

This is the logic previously described as “blockading the blockade.” Responding to a blockade does not necessarily mean closing a route or directly confronting every vessel. Rather, the cost of the blockade can be shifted to the wider chain of actors expected to enforce, support or absorb it.

The first signs of this shift are now emerging in the behavior of foreign companies. Reuters has reported that Iran has expanded its list of prohibited vessels to 56 ships and warned that vessels cooperating with blacklisted ships—including through ship-to-ship transfers—could also face restrictions.

More importantly, at least three Indian refineries and one major global energy company have reportedly decided to avoid using vessels on the list in an effort to reduce their exposure to risk.

This means deterrence is moving from the military sphere into the realm of economic decision-making. Tehran does not necessarily need to seize a vessel to alter an actor’s behavior. Raising the cost of dealing with a particular ship or network may be enough to prompt companies to withdraw in advance.

A second sign is the energy market’s search for alternative routes, including ship-to-ship transfers of LNG cargoes outside the Strait of Hormuz. Yet these routes, too, are now exposed to Iran’s new strategy. If one vessel is blacklisted, the risk can spread to other ships within the same logistical chain. An alternative route, therefore, is not necessarily a safe route.

The third sign can be seen in maritime traffic itself. According to Kpler data cited by Reuters, only six cargo vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Tuesday, compared with a 10-day average of 12 vessels. The previous day, only seven vessels had made the passage.

But last night’s developments pushed the pressure beyond shipping and directly into energy markets. Reuters reported that, following the latest Iranian and U.S. attacks and Iran’s missile strike on Jordan, Brent crude rose to $99.22 a barrel, while WTI climbed to $94.13. Brent is now roughly 25 percent higher than it was at the beginning of August.

More significant than crude oil itself are refined products—particularly diesel. The average U.S. diesel price reached a record $5.85 per gallon this week, surpassing even the previous record set in 2022. The Financial Times has warned that higher diesel prices directly affect the transportation of goods and the operation of agricultural machinery, with around 75 percent of U.S. diesel consumption linked to freight transportation and essential agricultural equipment.

This is where the original objective of the U.S. blockade could begin to turn into a vulnerability for the United States itself. Washington sought to weaken Iran’s resilience by putting pressure on its exports and energy routes. But if the result is reduced maritime traffic, higher insurance and shipping costs, surging oil and diesel prices, and mounting inflationary pressure, then the issue is no longer Iran’s resilience alone.

The resilience of the United States and its allies is also coming under pressure.

From this perspective, the main achievement of the new doctrine should not be measured solely by the number of vessels seized or the scale of military confrontation. The more important outcome is a change in the calculations of key actors: a refinery distancing itself from a particular vessel, a company rerouting its shipments, a ship choosing not to transit Hormuz, and a market pricing geopolitical risk into oil and diesel.

If this trend continues, the Strait of Hormuz will no longer be merely a geographical chokepoint. It will become the center of a broader pressure network whose effects extend from ships and their owners to insurers, refineries, energy companies and alternative routes—and ultimately to the cost of living in major economies.

The U.S. blockade was meant to contain Iran and erode its resilience. But the signs of recent days point to a different equation taking shape:

The blockade itself is now being blockaded.