Nournews: Ali al-Taher should not be viewed merely as a strategic elevation in southern Lebanon. For Benjamin Netanyahu, the hill may be part of a broader equation—one end of which lies in Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the other in Tehran.

Israel claims that, after weeks of operations, it has gained “operational control” of Ali al-Taher and cleared Hezbollah’s underground infrastructure. The claim has yet to be independently verified. Even before the announcement—and before Hezbollah had issued any official response—reports emerged alleging the presence of IRGC forces in tunnels beneath the hill. Such claims could naturally elevate the meaning of the operation from a battle against Hezbollah to a narrative of “defeating Iran in Lebanon.”

Later, however, a senior Israeli official said that no Iranian officers or advisers had been found in the area's tunnels. The contradiction itself suggests the need to distinguish between the military realities of the operation and the political narrative Israel has constructed around it.

But the more important question for Netanyahu lies elsewhere: If Ali al-Tahir is a victory, according to Tel Aviv’s narrative, what defeat is it supposed to compensate for?

Netanyahu launched the war against Iran with the direct involvement of the Trump administration and set objectives far broader than the destruction of a handful of sites. Those goals ranged from preventing Iran from developing nuclear capabilities and weakening its missile capacity to undermining its regional influence—and, at certain points, even changing Iran’s political structure. Netanyahu himself continues to speak of the “overthrow of Iran’s regime” as an objective that, in his view, has now come within reach.

Yet, as Israel approaches its October elections, a simple but weighty question remains for the Israeli prime minister: What was the ultimate achievement of that costly war?

If Iran’s nuclear, missile and regional capabilities were supposed to be eliminated, why does the Iran file remain open? Why is Netanyahu still talking about “completing the mission” and overthrowing Iran’s government? And why, after months of war, do Lebanon and Hezbollah remain part of the pressure confronting Israel?

This is where Ali al-Tahir becomes significant.

If Iran is Netanyahu’s central concern, Lebanon cannot be separated from the equation. Hezbollah is not viewed by Israel as merely a Lebanese actor, but as part of Iran’s regional network of power. Therefore, claiming control over a strategic elevation, discovering or destroying an underground network, and even highlighting alleged links between that network and Iran can all serve to construct a broader chain of narrative:

Iran was weakened; Hezbollah was pushed back; Ali al-Tahir fell; and Israel continues to win.

That is precisely the narrative Netanyahu needs on the eve of an election.

On paper, Ali al-Taher—even if some of Israel’s exaggerated claims prove accurate—would amount to no more than a military achievement. In the political arena, however, it could become a form of “compensatory symbol.” Netanyahu needs to present a picture in which the Iran war was not a failed or unfinished project, but rather the first stage of a larger victory whose effects are now becoming visible in Lebanon and elsewhere across the region.

The problem, however, is that military elevation does not necessarily translate into political elevation.

Israel’s claim of control over Ali al-Taher comes as Hezbollah’s retaliatory attacks in the area continue intensely, while recent reports indicate that conditions on the ground are far from stable. If “victory” cannot be translated into lasting security, the hill itself could shift from being an electoral asset to becoming a symbol of a war of attrition.

From this perspective, even the narrative surrounding the alleged presence of IRGC forces in the tunnels beneath Ali al-Taher is noteworthy. Although the claim was later not confirmed by an Israeli official, it served a clear purpose in the battle of narratives: inflating the significance of the operation from the defeat of a Hezbollah network into a blow against Iran itself.

Netanyahu now needs more than a military victory. He needs the political meaning of victory.

He must be able to explain to Israeli voters exactly what the war with Iran—with all its costs, casualties, destruction and regional consequences—has changed. If the answer to that question remains unclear, even control of a hill in southern Lebanon cannot permanently fill the void.

Perhaps this is why Ali al-Taher should not be seen as an isolated Lebanese file, but as part of Netanyahu’s electoral record in the shadow of the Iran war.

Netanyahu is trying to reach Tehran through Ali al-Taher—in other words, to compensate for the failure of the Iran war project by displaying victory on one of the region’s other fronts.

But the central question remains:

If the Iran war was supposed to strip Iran of its nuclear and missile capabilities, its regional influence and its capacity to act as a major regional power, why is Netanyahu still compelled to search for proof of victory in the tunnels of Ali al-Taher?

Ali al-Taher may be a strategic hill for Netanyahu. But ahead of the October elections, it may matter even more as an electoral hill—one meant to conceal the far greater height of failure in the costly war against Iran.