Nournews: Trump and the U.S. administration justified the war by claiming they were confronting an imminent nuclear threat. But this is precisely where the problem begins. Before the war, no independent and credible source—including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—had confirmed the existence of an active program in Iran to build nuclear weapons. On the eve of the war, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi explicitly said that the agency had not seen a “nuclear weapons program” in Iran. U.S. intelligence assessments also fell short of supporting claims that Iran had an active bomb-building program.

From this perspective, one of the main stated justifications for the war still faces an unanswered question: If the threat that the war was supposed to eliminate had not been independently verified as an active weapons program, exactly what was supposed to be “destroyed”?

But the record of “Operation Epic Fury” is not limited to the nuclear issue.

Ahead of the war, the Trump administration repeatedly emphasized that it would be a rapid and effective operation. Yet several months later, the reality on the ground tells a very different story. What was supposed to be a short and decisive war has turned into a prolonged conflict that has continued even after the official end of “Epic Fury.” The deployment of nearly 50,000 U.S. troops, 19 warships, and air and missile-defense assets in the region has been extended through 2027—a posture difficult to reconcile with the narrative of a short, concluded operation.

First: The war was not “clean.”

The notion of a “clean war” is essentially a propaganda concept, because no war can be assessed without considering its impact on civilians. In Minab, an attack on a girls’ school became one of the deadliest incidents of the war. It also created an undeniable war-crimes case against the authorities in the White House and prompted the United Nations to call for an independent investigation into the tragedy.

In the latest case, an attack on a wedding ceremony in Kuhestak, Sirik, reportedly killed at least four to five people and wounded nearly 70 others. A Reuters investigation found that evidence indicates U.S.-made munitions struck the site directly.

The war’s first major propaganda claim, therefore—that it was “clean”—cannot be reconciled with the reality of civilian casualties.

Second: The war was not quick.

While the U.S. administration spoke of rapid success, the conflict has entered its sixth and seventh months, retaliatory attacks have continued, and Washington is still keeping tens of thousands of troops and nearly 20 warships in the region. Some deployments have even been extended through 2027.

More importantly, the war can no longer be measured solely on the battlefield. Its effects have spread to energy markets, shipping and U.S. financial markets. On September 1, as the conflict intensified, Brent crude was moving toward $100 a barrel, while WTI reached $90.22 and the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds rose to 4.792 percent. Reuters reported that Treasury yields were approaching the 5 percent threshold, with energy-driven inflationary pressures increasing.

Third: The war was not effective.

Here, a distinction must be made between inflicting damage and achieving an objective. The United States has been able to damage infrastructure and capabilities in Iran. But damaging a capability is not the same as completely destroying it.

Iran’s missile capabilities have not been eliminated. Its drone capabilities remain intact. Iran is still capable of responding militarily to attacks with significant force, and retaliatory attacks have continued following periods of ceasefire. Therefore, if the objective was to establish lasting deterrence and eliminate Iran’s ability to strike, the continuation of the conflict itself is evidence that this objective has not been achieved.

The nuclear issue is even more complicated. In its report, the IAEA stated that it does not have access to four of Iran’s declared enrichment facilities and cannot determine the current size, composition or location of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile. The agency’s last assessable inventory included 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent.

It therefore cannot be claimed that the United States destroyed or removed this stockpile from Iran through military action. Even U.S. fact-checkers have emphasized that Trump’s claim of the “complete destruction” of Iran’s nuclear program is inconsistent with expert assessments, and that there was no evidence of a reconstructed nuclear weapons program prior to the attack.

As a result, if the war is assessed according to the very objectives Washington cited to justify it, “Epic Fury” faces a serious problem: Iran’s military capabilities have not been destroyed, its ability to retaliate remains, the nuclear issue has not been resolved, and the United States remains compelled to maintain a heavy military posture in the region.

From this perspective, the change in the operation’s name takes on a deeper significance. When a war cannot produce a clear record of achieved objectives, changing its designation can help change the terms of the debate. “Epic Fury” ends, and subsequent confrontations are placed under a more generic and less politically costly label. Instead of having all the costs and outcomes assessed on a single balance sheet, each new confrontation can be presented as a separate “operation.”

But names can be changed; the record cannot.

If the war has truly ended, the Pentagon should answer a few simple questions instead of changing the operation’s name: What was the objective? What was achieved? What was not achieved? What was the financial and military cost? How many civilians were killed? And why, after the operation officially ended, do nearly 50,000 U.S. troops and dozens of warships remain in the region?

Under such an accounting, “Epic Fury” appears less like a successful operation and more like a glaring gap between promises and results.

The war that was supposed to be clean produced civilian casualties; the war that was supposed to be quick lasted for months; and the war that was supposed to be effective has failed to achieve its stated objectives.

Therefore, if the benchmark is the objectives the United States itself announced, the question today is not why the name “Epic Fury” was changed. The real question is whether the name change is a deceptive attempt to evade accountability for a failed war.