For years, Donald Trump has cultivated a distinct image of himself: a formidable deal-maker who understands the rules of the game better than others, is not afraid to bluff, knows how to pressure the other side, and ultimately leaves the negotiating table with a strong hand. His book The Art of the Deal is also part of this personal brand, which later became a behavioral model in US foreign policy.

But there is a fundamental question: Can someone who raises the cost of reaching an agreement to such an extent really be considered a successful deal-maker?

Deal-making is not simply about the ability to exert pressure. A professional negotiator must know when to apply pressure, when to offer concessions, understand the interests of the other side, and, most importantly, ensure that the costs of the process do not rise to a point where the deal itself is no longer economically or politically justified.

From this perspective, the Iran case is a serious test of the “Trump the deal-maker” brand.

Washington could have pursued its dispute with Iran over its nuclear program within a political framework in which US nonproliferation concerns could be negotiated alongside Iran’s rights and interests. Such a path would naturally have required reciprocal concessions. But that is precisely what negotiation is about: finding a point at which both sides, despite their differences, consider an agreement more beneficial than continued confrontation.

But the entry of war into this equation changed the playing field.

War does not carry only military costs. Its human, economic, political, and security costs are also placed on the table. Civilian deaths, the destruction of infrastructure, damage to the economy, instability in energy markets, disruptions to trade, and heightened regional insecurity are all costs whose effects remain even after the fighting ends.

More importantly, however, these costs were not imposed on Iran alone. The United States has also paid heavy costs for such a policy. Direct military expenditures, the use and depletion of munitions and equipment, the need to replenish stockpiles, the cost of protecting troops and bases, higher energy costs, and the economic consequences of market instability inside the United States are only the most visible parts of the picture.

There are also less visible costs: the erosion of political capital, increased pressure on allies, more complicated regional dynamics, damage to the credibility of US deterrence, and the diversion of Washington’s resources and strategic focus from other global priorities.

This is where the central contradiction becomes clear.

If the ultimate goal of pressuring Iran was to compel Tehran to accept an agreement that Washington considered more favorable, the question must be asked: Has the war and its resulting costs brought the United States closer to an agreement, or made an agreement more difficult to reach?

This is precisely where the concept of Trump’s “art of the deal” should be tested.

A skilled deal-maker is not simply someone who can impose costs on the other side. His real skill lies in achieving the greatest possible result at the lowest possible cost. If securing concessions requires imposing such heavy costs that the other side loses its incentive to negotiate, public opinion is mobilized against an agreement, mistrust deepens, and even the United States incurs billions of dollars in costs, then an increase in pressure can no longer, by itself, be considered a sign of success.

The issue can be viewed even more simply: In any deal, the ratio between “cost” and “gain” must be calculated.

If reaching an agreement first requires waging a war, consuming enormous military resources, shocking the global economy, driving up energy prices, leaving behind human losses, and then returning to the same negotiating table, the unavoidable question is whether the same deal could have been reached at a far lower cost.

This is where the difference between “bargaining power” and “deal-making skill” becomes clear. Power can put the other side under pressure; skill must be able to turn that pressure into a durable agreement

A real deal-maker never sets the negotiating table on fire and leaves nothing left to negotiate.

Trump may be skilled at applying pressure, making threats, and increasing costs for a rival. But the success of a deal-maker is measured not by the intensity of the pressure, but by the final outcome and the cost of achieving it.

The war failed to resolve the central issue and instead imposed heavy costs on Iran, the United States, and the region. The claim of possessing the “art of the deal” therefore faces a serious question:

Does Trump really know the art of the deal, or is he simply a master at making the deal more expensive?