Recent aggressive rhetoric by Scott Bessent, the US Treasury secretary, against Iran can be interpreted simply within the framework of the Trump administration’s maximum-pressure campaign. But simultaneous developments inside the Treasury Department raise a different and noteworthy question: Has part of the intensified pressure on Iran, beyond Washington’s foreign-policy objectives, also acquired a domestic function for Bessent?

A recent Politico report describing a Treasury Department “depleted of experts and senior officials” gives this question added weight. According to published reports, since the beginning of Trump’s second administration, seven of the 16 Senate-confirmed senior Treasury officials have left or been removed from their positions, accounting for roughly 44%. In addition, 40 other political appointees had left the department by the end of June, while Bessent’s own office has gone through at least three chiefs of staff during the same period.

This situation points to an important reality: the Treasury secretary is responsible for carrying out an exceptionally broad set of missions at a time when the department faces serious challenges ranging from managing the national debt and bond market to implementing tax law, shaping fiscal policy, overseeing sanctions and conducting economic diplomacy. Under such circumstances, a shrinking management team and the departure of experienced officials can place the decision-making capacity of a vital department under significant strain.

The issue becomes even more important when the US financial market itself has become a difficult testing ground for Bessent. US national debt has surpassed $40 trillion, and the Treasury market has become increasingly sensitive to Trump administration policies and rising borrowing costs. The Treasury’s recent efforts to increase buybacks of longer-term debt have also failed to fully alleviate market concerns, while bond yields remain under pressure from underlying economic factors.

Against this backdrop, Iran represents a different kind of case for Bessent — one in which the power of the Treasury Department can be displayed in tangible and highly visible ways. He is now speaking of the “toughest sanctions in history” and has declared that the objective of these measures is to impose maximum economic pressure on Tehran.

This gives rise to a hypothesis worth examining: The more difficult Bessent’s performance becomes in the complex domestic areas of Treasury policy, the more the Iran portfolio could serve as a showcase of power for him. Sanctioning a bank, blocking a financial network, threatening buyers of Iranian oil or targeting revenue-transfer channels are outcomes that are far easier to measure and publicize than restructuring US debt or restoring confidence in the Treasury market.

The maximum-pressure campaign has been part of Trump’s official strategy, and Bessent has emphasized sanctions on Iran’s oil exports and financial network since taking office. But the point is that a foreign policy can simultaneously serve a domestic political function for the policymaker.

There is an even more significant indication. In the early months of the war, serious questions were raised in the US Senate Finance Committee about whether the Treasury Department had actually planned for the economic consequences of the Iran war before it began. A senior adviser to Bessent said he was unaware of any such planning, a matter that was later strongly criticized by opponents of the administration.

Therefore, perhaps the central question is not, “Why has Bessent taken such a hard line against Iran?” Rather, it should be asked: Why has the US Treasury secretary, at a time when his department is facing a major exodus of senior officials and a turbulent Treasury market, turned the Iran portfolio into one of the main showcases of his performance?

If the answer to this question reveals part of the reality, the economic war against Iran is not merely a campaign to pressure Tehran. For Bessent, it could also serve as a means of demonstrating that he is capable of delivering the objectives sought by Trump in the economic war against Iran, even as he and the department he leads face a serious crisis of capacity and confidence at home.