The Wall Street Journal has reported that Dan Driscoll, US secretary of the Army, will likely leave his position by the end of this calendar year, or possibly sooner, following months of tensions with Pete Hegseth, the US secretary of war. Driscoll’s departure would come as the US Army still lacks a permanent chief of staff following the abrupt removal of General Randy George, with General Christopher LaNeve serving in the role on an interim basis. Reuters has also reported that if Driscoll leaves, the US Army will be left without a Senate-confirmed secretary.
But the significance of the news goes far beyond a management change at the Pentagon. Driscoll is considered a close ally of JD Vance, and his relationship with Hegseth has been tense for some time. During his tenure, he supported structural and technological changes in the Army alongside General George. Now, following George’s departure, Driscoll himself is on the verge of leaving.
The intensity of the dispute between the two officials becomes clearer when considering Driscoll’s past comments about Hegseth. Before Hegseth was appointed, when asked for his assessment of him, Driscoll said: “I don’t think politics in America could sink so low as to appoint a third-rate TV host, who is known among his own colleagues as a ‘media thug,’ to run the largest army in the world.”
In another remark, made on the sidelines of a Veterans Day ceremony on November 11, 2025, Driscoll said of Hegseth: “The only thing my boss has no understanding of is war, but unfortunately, it is the thing he is most interested in.”
These remarks show that the dispute between Driscoll and Hegseth was not merely an administrative or personal disagreement. It was rooted in their differing views of war, military command and how the largest military structure in the US should be managed. This makes Driscoll’s possible departure an important sign of tensions at the top of the US national security establishment.
But the issue should not stop at the Pentagon. If Driscoll is viewed as a figure close to Vance, his possible departure should also be considered alongside recent changes at the White House. Caroline Leavitt, the White House press secretary and one of Trump’s most loyal media figures, was also recently removed from her position.
She announced that she would leave her post at the end of August. Although Leavitt’s case is formally different from Driscoll’s and the two should not necessarily be attributed to the same factor, the departure of a key figure in the president’s communications circle, particularly ahead of the midterm elections, is notable when viewed alongside the developments at the Pentagon.
What appears to be taking shape may be better described not as a “power struggle at the Pentagon,” but as competition and friction within the most sensitive layers of decision-making in the Trump administration. One side of these developments is visible at the Pentagon, between Hegseth and Driscoll; the other is visible at the White House, in changes to the administration’s political and media team. Taken together, these signs raise the question of whether internal disagreements within the Trump administration are moving beyond isolated disputes and entering a more structural phase.
The war with Iran cannot be separated from these developments. The US entered the war with the assumption that military superiority could quickly produce a clear political outcome. But the situation today is far removed from the picture of a swift and decisive victory that Trump had portrayed.
The war with Iran should be viewed as a complex, multilayered and, at the same time, dangerous deadlock. Neither the military option has produced a definitive way out nor has the diplomatic track so far brought the crisis to a stable point. As a result, the US finds itself in a position where continuing the war is extremely costly, while withdrawing or accepting an uncertain outcome would carry an even heavier political cost for an administration that entered the war promising victory.
This is precisely the point at which an ill-considered decision by a delusional individual can turn into a prolonged war of attrition. A war that was supposed to produce results within a short period can, if it continues, become a series of interconnected problems: military costs, an energy crisis, inflationary pressure, the bond market, government debt and, ultimately, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of American voters.
Economic pressure is particularly important in this context. Rising energy and refined-product prices are directly passed on to the cost of living. At the same time, the federal government is facing enormous debt and rising financing costs. Continuing an expensive war under such circumstances is not merely a Pentagon issue; it can become an issue for the Treasury Department, the bond market, monetary policy and, ultimately, the White House.
The midterm elections make this chain of events even more political. As the elections approach, the gap between Trump’s initial promise of victory and the war’s real costs for American voters will become increasingly important. If the war produces no clear outcome while energy prices, inflation and government spending rise, political pressure on the administration will increase.
Under such circumstances, the possibility of the crisis moving from the military sphere to the economic sphere and then to the political sphere becomes more serious. If the bond market remains under pressure, federal debt continues to rise, energy costs remain elevated and public opposition to the war grows, divisions within the power structure could also intensify.
In this environment, resignations and dismissals can become a mechanism for releasing pressure. A war that was supposed to showcase American power now has the potential to intensify and expose existing divisions within the US power structure.
From this perspective, Dan Driscoll’s possible departure is not an isolated event. Its significance lies in the fact that a figure close to Vance, after months of tensions with the secretary of war, is leaving one of the most sensitive military positions in the US, while at the same time, one of the administration’s most prominent media figures is leaving her position at the White House.
Trump began the war with Iran to demonstrate American power. But Washington now faces a different question: Is a war that was supposed to showcase US power instead exposing divisions within the country’s power structure?
If the military and diplomatic deadlock continues while the energy crisis, debt, bond-market pressures and public dissatisfaction intensify, the pressure of the war could move from the Pentagon to the White House, from the White House to the economy, and from the economy into US domestic politics.
In that case, the issue will no longer be merely the departure of an Army secretary or a White House press secretary. It will be about the Trump administration’s ability to maintain cohesion in the face of a crisis that it began with an ill-considered and hasty decision aimed at achieving a quick victory, but which is now becoming a prolonged test for the entire US power structure.