Nournews: Europe is currently facing a situation that could challenge Washington’s claim that the Strait of Hormuz is “open,” as well as its assertion that the United States has effective control over the waterway. European gas prices, which stood at around €31 per megawatt-hour before the U.S. attack on Iran, have now climbed to around €64—more than doubling. At the same time, oil-product markets have been hit by sharp increases in the prices of diesel, gasoline and jet fuel. Reuters has reported that European diesel prices rose by more than 70 percent during the war.

These figures are not simply the result of normal fluctuations in energy markets. If the Strait of Hormuz is, as Donald Trump claims, “open” and effectively controlled by the United States, why are global gas markets and oil-product markets still facing such a severe shock? And why does vessel traffic through the world’s most important energy chokepoint remain far below pre-war levels?

The latest shipping data provide a clear answer. Reuters reported that only seven cargo vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday—four entering and three leaving—and none of them were large oil tankers or LNG carriers. Before the war, Hormuz was the route for nearly one-fifth of the world’s crude oil and LNG shipments.

Under such circumstances, describing the strait as “open” requires a more precise definition. Establishing a special route under the protection and coordination of the U.S. military for a limited number of tankers is fundamentally different from a return to normal, unrestricted maritime traffic. The market appears to understand that distinction.

The shock to European gas markets begins precisely here. Disruptions to LNG flows from the Persian Gulf, particularly reduced Qatari LNG shipments, have put pressure on European markets, while competition between Europe and Asia for alternative cargoes has intensified. Europe, which sought to reduce its dependence on Russian gas following the war in Ukraine, is now facing a new reality: replacing pipeline gas with LNG does not eliminate energy risks; it shifts those risks to the global LNG market and the security of maritime routes.

The situation is reminiscent of the 2022 energy crisis. After Russian gas exports fell sharply, Europe was forced to turn to the global LNG market, with the United States becoming one of its main suppliers. U.S. LNG exports to Europe increased by 141 percent in 2022 compared with the previous year. But that shift quickly became a source of political friction on both sides of the Atlantic.

German and French officials at the time voiced concerns over high LNG prices. German Economy Minister Robert Habeck criticized “astronomical” energy prices and supplier profits, while French President Emmanuel Macron said the price of U.S. gas for Europeans was roughly three to four times higher than the price in the U.S. domestic market. Their remarks showed that the energy crisis was not merely an economic issue; it had also become a source of political tension between Europe and the United States.

Of course, the price differential cannot be attributed solely to “price gouging” by the United States. Liquefaction, shipping, insurance and terminal capacity all contribute to the final cost of LNG. But the key reality was that Europe had to pay substantially more to replace Russian gas.

Now, that same Europe is facing another shock—with one major difference: this time, it is not only gas prices that are rising. Reuters has reported that European diesel prices have surged by more than 70 percent, while global refined-product markets are facing supply shortages. Reduced refining capacity in the Middle East and disruptions to shipping routes have placed gasoline, diesel and jet fuel under severe price pressure.

The issue is even more significant because the current crisis comes as Europe’s gas storage levels are already below normal. Storage is at around 62 percent, compared with a five-year average of roughly 78 percent for this point in the year. Europe is therefore facing both rising prices and the challenge of securing supplies and replenishing storage ahead of the colder months.

The central question, then, is no longer simply, “Why has European gas become so expensive?” The bigger question is this: If the United States has truly taken control of Hormuz and is keeping the waterway open, why is the impact of that control not visible in global energy markets?

Markets usually respond to political claims in the language of prices. Today, the market’s answer is clear: European gas prices have more than doubled, diesel prices have surged by more than 70 percent, and gasoline and other refined products are also under pressure. At the same time, vessel traffic through Hormuz remains far below normal levels.

From this perspective, the Hormuz crisis is not merely an oil crisis; it is a test of the U.S. claim to control the world’s most important energy chokepoint. If control means restoring security and normal maritime traffic, the available market and shipping data do not yet present such a picture. And if what exists is merely the limited, protected passage of a handful of vessels, it cannot be equated with the “opening” of Hormuz.

The global energy market is paying the price for this gap between claim and reality—from refineries and shipping companies to factories and European consumers. Hormuz may be a narrow waterway on the map, but the prices of gas, diesel, gasoline and other refined products show that its impact on the global economy extends far beyond the few dozen kilometers of its physical width.