Recent developments in the Iran-US file and Tehran’s latest positions on the Strait of Hormuz indicate that the issue is no longer simply about how ships will transit the strait or what mechanism will be used to reopen it. The recent remarks by the new SNSC secretary, particularly on his first day in office and during a meeting with the Chinese ambassador, indicate that Hormuz is becoming one of the central pillars of the political equation surrounding an end to the war.

Against this backdrop, Dr. Mohsen Rezaei’s significant statement should be understood as more than a media declaration about the Strait of Hormuz. His position links the scope of Iran’s conditions for reopening the strait to an end to the war, the lifting of the blockade, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to hostilities on other fronts across the region:

“Iran’s message is clear: The Strait of Hormuz will not be reopened until the United States ends the war and the blockade, releases Iran’s frozen assets, and the war ends across the region, including in Lebanon and Gaza. The Strait of Hormuz will remain closed until all conditions are met.”

The significance of this position lies in the change in the level at which the issue is being framed. Hormuz is no longer simply a matter of how ships will transit the strait or how the maritime blockade will be lifted. It has become part of the broader equation for ending the war and determining the conditions that will follow.

Until now, a significant part of the discussions over Hormuz had revolved around a technical and operational question: Under what mechanism and conditions would ships be allowed to transit? The understandings reached in Iran-Oman negotiations could largely be understood within this framework. But the new SNSC secretary’s position indicates that, from Tehran’s perspective, a technical agreement on transit routes and traffic management does not necessarily mean that the strait will be reopened. There is a gap between an “understanding on the model for managing Hormuz” and a “political decision to reopen it,” and that gap must be bridged by tangible changes in US behavior.

This shift sends a clear message to Washington: Hormuz will not be reopened in exchange for a limited and temporary concession. If ending the war, lifting the blockade, releasing Iranian assets and halting hostilities on other regional fronts are among Tehran’s conditions, then Hormuz moves from being an isolated issue in the negotiations to becoming part of a broader package for resolving the crisis. In other words, Iran is seeking to shift the equation from “Hormuz in exchange for lifting the blockade” to “a change in US behavior in exchange for a change in the status of Hormuz.”

Against this backdrop, the new SNSC secretary’s meeting with the Chinese ambassador on his first working day also carries significance. Reiterating these positions during the meeting could indicate that the framework outlined for ending the war and releasing Iranian assets is not merely a media message, but part of the national security decision-making apparatus’s approach to the ongoing developments. China, given its position in the international system, its strategic relations with Iran and its ability to influence economic and energy calculations, is also an important actor that could play a role in the calculations of both sides if the crisis continues.

The significance of this approach becomes clearer when the “time leverage” is also factored into the equation. In recent weeks, some analyses have suggested that Tehran is not necessarily in a hurry to reach an agreement and could use prolonged negotiations to increase the political and economic costs of the crisis for the United States. Some analyses have reduced this approach to Iran waiting for the outcome of the US midterm elections. Yet the leverage of time is conceptually broader in this context: It involves gradually increasing the cost of continuing the crisis for Washington and raising the value of the concessions the United States would have to make to change the status quo. The midterm elections are one important point in this calculation, not the entirety of it.

In fact, Hormuz and time acquire meaning in relation to one another. The strategic importance of Hormuz to global energy security and trade creates the possibility of sustained pressure on the other side’s economic and political calculations, while the continuation of the crisis accumulates that pressure over time. From this perspective, tying the reopening of the strait to a set of conditions is an attempt to transform Hormuz from a temporary lever into a tool for shaping the framework of a final agreement.

But alongside all these calculations, one variable cannot be removed from the equation: the possibility that the United States could once again use military force to increase pressure on Iran. Under current circumstances, Washington may, if it feels the need to strengthen its negotiating leverage, resort to limited and low-intensity military actions. Such actions would not necessarily be intended to launch a full-scale war; rather, they could be aimed at sending a deterrent message, increasing the costs for Tehran and seeking to alter Iran’s calculations at the negotiating table. Therefore, the possibility of a limited phase of confrontation cannot be separated from the course of the negotiations.

Nevertheless, the scenario of a high-intensity, large-scale war has a much lower probability in the short term. The most important factor is serious uncertainty over whether the consequences of such an action could be controlled. In the event of an attack, Iran has the capacity to mount a serious and even unpredictable response, and this could expose US calculations to significant risks. At the same time, the absence of a clear and effective operational plan for achieving maximal objectives through war represents another important constraint on Washington’s decision-making.

A third factor is the limitation on ammunition stocks and the capacity to sustain military operations, an issue that has even been acknowledged by senior US officials. This indicates that although US military capabilities are extensive, they do not necessarily amount to unlimited capacity for a prolonged, high-intensity war. Under such circumstances, entering a war whose scope, duration and costs fall beyond Washington’s control could impose significant strategic costs on the US government.

In addition to these factors, the link between the war and the US midterm elections creates another significant political constraint. An escalation of the war, particularly if it leads to higher energy prices, an expansion of the conflict or increased American casualties, could directly affect the domestic political climate in the United States and the electoral competition. From this perspective, there is a fundamental difference for the Trump administration between using limited military pressure as a bargaining tool and entering a high-intensity war whose political consequences cannot be controlled.

Taken together, these factors indicate that, in the short term, the more likely scenario is the limited and controlled use of military force to increase pressure on Iran, rather than the launch of an all-out war. This assessment does not eliminate the possibility of a high-intensity war; rather, that possibility is currently considered less likely and would depend above all on Iran’s response, the success of limited US actions, developments in the negotiations and Washington’s political calculations.

Under these circumstances, the roles of Oman, Qatar and Pakistan should also be viewed differently from those of the major powers. These countries can serve as communication channels and facilitators of negotiations, but guaranteeing a lasting agreement between Tehran and Washington is a different matter. China and Russia, by contrast, could have greater capacity to play political, economic or guarantor roles if a more comprehensive agreement takes shape, although neither can resolve the fundamental disputes between Iran and the United States on its own. Europe, meanwhile, faces a serious deficit of political trust from Tehran given the activation of the snapback mechanism.

Therefore, what is happening in Oman today should not be viewed merely as negotiations to reopen a strait. The more substantive issue is negotiating the conditions that could lead to an end to the state of war. A technical understanding on how Hormuz will be managed may have been reached, but the final decision on reopening it has moved to a level beyond technical matters.

The new SNSC secretary’s position can be viewed as a sign that a new framework is being consolidated in Tehran’s calculations: Iran is prepared to discuss the future mechanism for managing Hormuz, but it will not separate the reopening of the strait from the broader issue of ending the war. This approach significantly changes the equation. Hormuz is no longer merely a point of leverage during wartime; it can become leverage for shaping the conditions for ending the war.

The main question now is not when Hormuz will reopen. The strategic question is what price Washington is willing to pay to return Hormuz to normal conditions, and whether the political, economic and strategic pressures resulting from the continuation of the crisis can alter US calculations toward accepting Tehran’s conditions. Alongside this is another important question: Can the two sides make use of diplomacy and mediation to contain the crisis before crossing new thresholds of confrontation?

The answers to these two questions, more than any other factor, will determine the course of the Oman negotiations and the future trajectory of the Iran-US confrontation.