Nournews: As reports warn of growing pressure on U.S. weapons stockpiles and the Pentagon pushes to accelerate arms production, new figures are emerging on the use of air-defense systems by Arab countries during the recent war. The figures offer a striking picture not of lasting security, but of the high costs of relying on an externally driven security architecture.

Reuters, citing the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), reported that Saudi Arabia fired around 2,400 PAC-3 interceptor missiles during the first 38 days of the war, accounting for roughly 86 percent of its estimated stockpile of 2,800 missiles.

By last April, only about 400 missiles were reportedly left in Saudi Arabia’s inventory. CSIS also said other Arab Persian Gulf states had used significant portions of their air-defense stockpiles, suggesting that the conflict had evolved beyond a limited confrontation into a broader process of military attrition across the region.

Earlier, an Israeli cabinet minister confirmed that Iron Dome systems had been deployed in the UAE during the 40-day war.

Weapons, Security and Dependence

The figures, alongside reports on the role of some Arab countries in the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, raise a central question: Whose security were these weapons and military infrastructures ultimately protecting?

Arab states have spent billions of dollars over decades on advanced weapons and security systems. Yet the recent war has highlighted a fundamental problem: dependence on the U.S. security umbrella has not necessarily produced lasting security. Instead, it can place part of these countries’ military capabilities and strategic infrastructure at the disposal of Washington and Tel Aviv.

The contrast with Iran is also significant. Despite years of sanctions and severe economic restrictions, Iran has pursued the development of domestic defense capabilities. Many Arab states, by contrast, have relied heavily on foreign arms purchases to build their defense capabilities.

The recent conflict has put the difference between these two approaches into sharper focus.

What has been presented to regional countries as an American-backed security model, critics argue, has increasingly functioned as a system of dependence. In times of crisis, that dependence can mean that the airspace, military infrastructure and defense capabilities of host countries are drawn into the strategic priorities of the United States and Israel.

Good-Neighborly Relations and Regional Security

Iran has repeatedly called for good-neighborly relations, collective security and regional security arrangements led by the countries of the region themselves.

Initiatives such as the Hormuz Peace Endeavor have been presented within this framework, with security in the Persian Gulf envisioned as a product of cooperation among the region’s littoral states rather than the permanent presence of outside powers.

Iran has also consistently argued for reducing foreign intervention and giving regional governments and nations a greater role in maintaining their own security.

Against this backdrop, the extensive use of Arab air-defense systems during the recent war raises another question: Why do some regional countries continue to rely on powers that are themselves directly involved in regional conflicts?

The war has also demonstrated that buying more weapons does not automatically translate into greater security. If strategic decisions continue to be made outside the region, expanding military arsenals may simply increase the cost of dependence.

From Alliances to Strategic Autonomy

Saudi Arabia’s efforts to build an alliance with Pakistan and Turkey, and the possibility of expanding the initiative to countries such as Egypt, could signal an attempt to establish a more independent regional security framework.

But if such efforts continue to rely on the U.S.-led security architecture, they face an obvious contradiction.

Some Western media outlets have portrayed the emerging alliances as moves directed against Iran. Tehran, however, could view such initiatives differently if they genuinely contribute to regional security, reduce the military presence of foreign powers and establish an indigenous security mechanism.

At the same time, Reuters’ report on the U.S. State Department’s approval of the sale of 5,250 Patriot interceptor missiles to several Arab countries raises a basic question: How can regional security become independent while dependence on U.S. weapons continues to grow?

A security system that depends on a foreign power for weapons, training, logistical support and critical elements of its military infrastructure can hardly claim full strategic independence.

Hormuz and the Future of Regional Security

These developments have once again highlighted the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz and its central role in Iran’s security calculations.

With the United States continuing to maintain and strengthen its military presence and bases in the region, temporary agreements alone cannot automatically restore normal conditions in the Strait.

Iran’s foreign minister has stressed that an agreement with Oman does not amount to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian officials have also said that any change in U.S. behavior must be concrete and verifiable. The conditions cited include an end to threats and aggression against Iran and its allies, the lifting of the maritime blockade, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from around Iran, compensation for war-related damages, the lifting of sanctions and the release of Iranian assets.

The broader message is clear: regional security, Iran argues, should ultimately be managed by the countries of the region themselves.

The Patriots fired over Arab skies were more than interceptor missiles. They became a symbol of the cost of a security architecture built on years of dependence on an outside power.

The recent war has therefore revived a fundamental choice for the countries of the region: security purchased from abroad, or security built at home.

The experience of the war suggests that when security is designed outside the region, it may, at the moment of crisis, serve the interests of another power more than those of the country it was supposed to protect.