Recent regional developments cannot be understood merely by asking whether the path ahead will lead to war or an agreement. Although this binary appears simple and understandable on the surface, it conceals an important part of the reality on the ground. The central issue today is the competition over “designing the playing field”, determining which actor can create conditions in which its rival is forced to make decisions at a time, place and within a framework that is not favorable to it.
In this context, “time” has become a strategic variable. Iran, the US and the Israeli regime are all seeking to manage time to their advantage. However, the key difference is that Washington and Tel Aviv are facing pressures stemming from their electoral calendars, while Tehran can use these very constraints to alter the balance of decision-making.
The recent conduct of the US administration, particularly Donald Trump himself, regarding the technical talks between Iran and Oman on arrangements for managing and overseeing maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz should also be analyzed within this framework. Washington’s effort to promote the narrative that a possible agreement between Iran and Oman would amount to the “reopening of the Strait of Hormuz” is, in reality, an attempt to quickly move beyond one stage and turn a technical and preliminary measure into a political achievement.
While a possible Iran-Oman agreement on mechanisms for managing and monitoring maritime traffic could merely serve as a necessary condition for entering a new phase, it does not in any way mean that a comprehensive agreement has been achieved or that all remaining issues have been resolved. The sufficient condition is the implementation of commitments accepted by the US side within the framework of the Islamabad understanding, including obligations related to returning Iran’s assets, consolidating the ceasefire in Lebanon, and the clause concerning Iran’s role in ensuring security in the Strait of Hormuz.
From this perspective, Trump’s rush to move beyond the stage of Iran-Oman technical negotiations and present it as a final success could be a sign of time pressure on the US administration. Washington is in a situation where it needs a presentable foreign policy achievement; one that can both reduce domestic criticism and be portrayed as evidence of governmental success ahead of the congressional elections. However, the attempt to separate one part of the agreement process from the broader package of reciprocal commitments shows that the core issue remains centered on the “management of time and the sequence of implementing obligations.”
The Israeli regime is also experiencing one of the most complex political and security periods in its history. The prolonged war, continued confrontation on the Lebanon front, pressure on reserve forces, economic costs and rising social concerns have shifted the issue of attrition from the military sphere to the political arena.
A recent poll by the Israeli regime’s Channel 13 television is significant in this context. According to the poll, Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition would secure 51 seats, the anti-Netanyahu opposition would win 58 seats, and Arab parties would gain 11 seats. These figures do not represent a definitive prediction of the election outcome, but they indicate that Netanyahu’s political position remains fragile and that any security development could influence the political landscape.
Under the parliamentary system of the Israeli regime, forming a government requires at least 61 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Securing 51 seats means Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, along with religious and far-right parties, would still be 10 seats short of the threshold. This situation shows that even if the right-wing camp remains dominant, forming the next government would require difficult coalition-building and the management of internal divisions.
Netanyahu needs a presentable achievement to change this situation, but he is trapped in a difficult paradox. Continuing the war without a clear outcome could deepen his political erosion, while ending the war without a tangible achievement could weaken the narrative of victory. For this reason, time has become less of an opportunity and more of a source of pressure for the Israeli regime’s prime minister.
On the other side, the US is also facing its own constraints. The congressional midterm elections on November 4 will force the Trump administration to balance support for Israel, avoiding entanglement in a costly war, and maintaining the image of a government successful in foreign policy.
Trump has so far faced a dual challenge: he has neither gained a wartime achievement that he can present to the public as a victory, nor does diplomacy currently offer him a definitive outcome to showcase. In addition, a significant part of his political base within the anti-war “MAGA” movement, which has supported him under the slogans of “America First” and opposition to costly foreign interventions, strongly opposes US involvement in another war.
Under these circumstances, the interests of Washington and Tel Aviv are not entirely aligned. Israel may require a major security action to reshape its domestic political environment, but Trump must calculate the regional and domestic costs of such a move.
However, any analysis of current trends remains incomplete unless Iran is also considered as an active and influential actor. One common mistake in analyzing regional developments is portraying Iran merely as a party reacting to US and Israeli decisions; whereas Tehran, as a strategic actor with multiple tools at its disposal to alter political, security and economic equations, is seeking to shape the decision-making environment of the other side.
Iran’s strategy could be based on the principle that, through a combination of effective actions on the ground, diplomacy and the intelligent use of regional capacities, it can increase the costs of high-risk choices for its rivals. The objective of such an approach is not merely to prevent war or reach an agreement, but rather to restrict the other side’s freedom of action and alter its calculations.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the clearest examples of this logic. The importance of Hormuz is not limited merely to energy transit or a maritime route; rather, the strait is a strategic variable in the region’s security and economic calculations. The Iran-Oman talks on how to manage and oversee traffic through this waterway demonstrate that even maritime security must be analyzed within a framework extending beyond a purely technical issue.
Within this framework, Tehran is seeking to maintain a balance between two principles: first, demonstrating responsibility regarding regional security and maritime traffic; and second, preventing a limited technical measure from becoming a tool for ignoring reciprocal commitments. In other words, managing Hormuz is part of a broader equation in which confidence-building, fulfilment of obligations and the balance between rights and responsibilities are of importance.
The value of a strategic lever does not always lie in its immediate use; sometimes its most important function is the impact it has on the behavior and calculations of a rival. Just as Lebanon, negotiations and other regional files are not merely separate issues, they are also part of a broader competition over managing the conditions under which decisions are made.
From this perspective, the coming months should be viewed as a period of competition over “time.” Netanyahu will seek to alter the security equation before the elections; Trump will attempt to balance the demands of US domestic politics with his foreign commitments; and Iran will seek to further restrict the options available to the other side while maintaining the initiative.
Under such circumstances, the winner is not necessarily the actor that takes the first action or presents the final proposal; rather, it is the actor that can change the rules of decision-making in a way that leaves its rival facing fewer options and higher costs.
For this reason, the central question regarding the region’s future developments may not be whether war will break out or an agreement will be reached; rather, it is who will be able to manage time and shape the playing field.