Three principal frameworks—confidence-building, permanent confrontation, and engagement after demonstrating strength—can be identified as the dominant paradigms shaping Iran's approach toward the West. According to this analysis, the experience of recent years suggests that sustainable cooperation with Western countries can only be achieved after Iran has established its strength, safeguarded its independence, and raised the costs of confrontation for the opposing side.
Broadly speaking, three major paradigms, or reference frameworks, have characterized Iran's approach toward the West over the past decades.
The first is the confidence-building framework. It argues that, due to certain radical and ill-considered actions taken in the early years following the 1979 Islamic Revolution—largely as reactions to historical grievances—a deep wall of mistrust emerged between Iran and the West. This mistrust has, according to the framework, prevented constructive engagement and hindered Iran's integration into global value chains.
Proponents of this approach contend that Iran should learn the language of dialogue with the international community and remove barriers to cooperation with the West through engagement, transparency, and confidence-building. In doing so, Iran would be able to join the path of economic development and benefit from expanding opportunities.
Within this framework, little distinction is made between the United States on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. Instead, advocates recommend balancing relations among the major powers. Since sanctions have, in their view, pushed Iran excessively toward China and Russia, every opportunity should be used to increase the West's share in Iran's economy. The clearest practical manifestation of this approach could be seen in the Iranian government's treatment of Chinese partners in the years following the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA).
One of the core assumptions of the confidence-building framework is that the Persian Gulf has gradually lost its strategic importance for the United States and that Washington has long sought to reduce its regional presence. Another assumption is that the persistence of sanctions stems primarily from domestic radicalism and the vested interests of those benefiting from sanctions. Consequently, advocates believe that transparency and confidence-building constitute the principal remedy for sanctions.
The second framework stands at the opposite end of the spectrum. It regards engagement with the West as fundamentally futile and envisions no realistic prospect for cooperation. According to this view, Iran and the West are locked in an enduring confrontation that amounts to a permanent conflict.
The third analytical paradigm, however, offers a different perspective. Drawing on the views and practical approach of the late martyred leader, it may be described as the framework of demonstrating strength, or more precisely, engagement after demonstrating strength and preserving independence.
This framework argues that unless Iran first demonstrates its indigenous capabilities and strategic independence, attempts to prove goodwill through confidence-building and transparency will not lead to constructive relations with the West. On the contrary, such efforts would only encourage greater pressure from the Anglo-Saxon bloc aimed at forcing Iran's submission.
Based on repeated historical experience, proponents of this framework argue that the American strategic mindset—heavily influenced by pro-Israeli lobbying—finds an independent and self-reliant Iran on the northern shores of the Persian Gulf unacceptable. Consequently, they believe Iran must be systematically weakened in order to secure an American-Israeli regional order.
Within this framework, claims that the United States seeks to withdraw from the Persian Gulf are viewed merely as part of its declared policy and a broader strategy of strategic deception. According to this perspective, Washington will never abandon its defined geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region. The Persian Gulf, as the birthplace of the petrodollar system and the principal arena for petrodollar recycling, remains both a cornerstone of the U.S. economy and a key instrument for containing China in future geopolitical and geostrategic competition.
From this perspective, the imposition of two existential and bloody wars within less than nine months, together with a series of war crimes committed against the Iranian people, was not the result of insufficient engagement or confidence-building. Rather, it reflected the perception that military action against Iran would entail only limited costs.
Statements by Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi in the days preceding the Ramadan war reportedly indicate that Iran made every effort to build confidence, yet those efforts failed to gain acceptance in Washington. This, proponents argue, was precisely the danger against which the late martyred leader consistently warned: that sending signals of conciliation in the face of existential threats would only embolden the adversary.
Nevertheless, this framework does not reject the possibility of cooperation between Iran and the West altogether. The late leader neither advocated economic isolation nor opposed economic engagement with Western countries. Rather, his speeches and practical conduct suggest that constructive cooperation can only emerge after Iran has successfully completed the difficult process of demonstrating its strength.
Accordingly, optimistic efforts to establish goodwill through transparency and confidence-building often increase the costs of achieving meaningful cooperation and postpone the prospects for genuine engagement with the West.
Supporters of this argument cite Syria as an example. They contend that the Syrian government's restraint—supported by Iranian military advisers—toward the concentration of extremist militants in Idlib may have temporarily reduced tensions, but ultimately paved the way for repeated Israeli attacks, the collapse of Syria, and the twelve-day war of June 2025. By contrast, they argue that the firm response ordered by General Qassem Soleimani following Israel's attack on the T-4 Air Base in April 2018 compelled Israel to retreat and suspend further operations.
Within this context, today's insistence by Iran's Supreme Leader on preserving the country's strategic leverage in the Strait of Hormuz is portrayed as a continuation of the late leader's doctrine of demonstrating strength. According to this interpretation, for a country subjected to military aggression and existential threats from what is described as the North Atlantic imperial camp, pursuing confidence-building and transparency before establishing deterrence would only intensify conflict, increase costs, and delay lasting peace and security.
Supporters of this framework further argue that psychological and media operations conducted by Iran's adversaries in the months following the ceasefire demonstrate that weakening the "demonstrating strength" paradigm and replacing it with a confidence-building approach has become a central objective of their strategic communications and diplomacy.
Therefore, they conclude, any future strategy for Iran must address the challenges of navigating the transitional period from confrontation to demonstrated strength before meaningful engagement with the West can become possible.
As argued elsewhere, the atmosphere created by the JCPOA was not, in itself, a genuine window of opportunity for cooperation with the West. Rather, it could have served as a means of reducing risks for Chinese companies operating outside the U.S.-led international order.
From this perspective, Iran's strategic mistake during the JCPOA period was the assumption that long-term partnerships with American and European companies could be secured through confidence-building and transparency without first establishing strategic leverage. As a result, opportunities to deepen industrial cooperation with Chinese firms were lost, while European and American companies ultimately refrained from long-term investment because of signals and warnings issued by the U.S. government.
Advocates of the third framework argue that had the principle of demonstrating strength guided Iran's foreign policy, the country would not only have achieved deeper industrial cooperation with Chinese companies but could also have shifted part of the burden and cost of demonstrating strength vis-à-vis the West onto its Chinese partners.