For Iran's system of governance, July 18 marks not only the anniversary of accepting Resolution 598 but also the emergence of a strategic political doctrine that remains relevant as Iran faces one of its most complex confrontations with the US and the Israeli regime. If the eight-year imposed war tested the resolve of the Iranian nation, today's circumstances represent another test. The battlefield, however, is no longer confined to land, air, and sea. It now extends from the negotiating table to information warfare, from economic sanctions to intelligence and legal battles.
Under these conditions, the greatest strategic mistake is to view war and peace as opposing choices, as though advocating negotiations means abandoning resistance, or emphasizing military strength means rejecting diplomacy. Iran's historical experience, particularly its acceptance of Resolution 598, demonstrates the opposite. At least in the past century, Iran has never initiated war. Rather, war has consistently been imposed on it. As in the recent 12-day and 40-day wars and other confrontations, Tehran was not the initiator of hostilities but responded to sustained pressure, threats, sanctions, assassinations, and military aggression. Throughout its history, Iran has adhered to the same principle: neither surrender nor aggression.
The eight years of the Sacred Defense embodied this approach. Iran entered the conflict shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution with limited military preparedness and without the support of major powers. In contrast, nearly all major powers directly or indirectly backed Iraq's Ba'athist regime. Yet the Islamic Republic not only prevented the country's collapse but also thwarted the enemy's primary objective of undermining Iran's independence and territorial integrity.
The strength of a political system, however, lies not only in its ability to wage war but also in recognizing when to shift the arena of competition. By the final years of the eight-year war, regional and international conditions had changed. Although Iran faced mounting pressure, Tehran maintained the upper hand and accepted Resolution 598 from a position of strength. The decision did not mark the end of resistance but its transition from the military arena to the political and legal arenas.
Events soon confirmed this. Days after Iran accepted the resolution, Iraq's Ba'athist regime, assuming Tehran had accepted peace out of weakness, launched another offensive. Iran's response overturned Saddam Hussein's calculations. The renewed mobilization of the Iranian people and the resistance of the armed forces demonstrated that accepting the ceasefire reflected a deliberate decision made from a position of strength, not weakness. Iraq was ultimately compelled to accept the very peace whose terms it had previously resisted.
That historical experience is more relevant today than ever. In recent months, Iran has endured a major conflict with the US and the Israeli regime, demonstrating that the Islamic Republic has no hesitation in defending its sovereignty, security, and independence and will respond decisively if war is imposed upon it. At the same time, the conflict also showed that even the most successful military operations do not end strategic competition. Once the guns fall silent, the contest continues through diplomacy, international law, economics, media, and public opinion.
For that reason, if missile capabilities, defense readiness, and national unity were Iran's principal assets during wartime, then in the postwar period, smart diplomacy, purposeful negotiations, and sound political management become essential complements to those strengths. A country that fails to secure its battlefield gains through diplomacy may ultimately have to pay the same price again on the battlefield. Likewise, diplomacy without the backing of power amounts to little more than accepting the other side's demands.
This is the lesson Resolution 598 taught Iranian policymakers: power and negotiation are not rivals but complements. Power compels the other side to recognize realities, while diplomacy transforms those realities into agreements, commitments, and lasting achievements. Any attempt today to portray resistance and negotiation, or diplomacy and defensive strength, as mutually exclusive reflects a strategic miscalculation. Just as no prudent military commander enters negotiations without leverage, no prudent statesman allows the gains secured through strength to erode for lack of diplomacy.
Over the past four decades, Iran has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not seek war, yet neither does it fear it. The nation has initiated no conflict, but whenever its independence and security have come under threat, it has stood firm. At the same time, if those same objectives can be achieved through dignified diplomacy, Iran has shown its willingness to pursue that path. In Iran's political culture, peace is not a sign of weakness but a product of strength.
Perhaps the most important message of July 18, the anniversary of the acceptance of Resolution 598, is that courage is not measured solely by launching missiles or fighting on the battlefield. True courage lies in knowing when to fight and when to negotiate while never abandoning a single principle: safeguarding Iran, preserving its independence, and protecting its national interests.
Today, as in the past, Iran requires both forms of courage: the courage to fight if war is imposed upon it and the courage to make peace if peace can secure the achievements won on the battlefield. These are not contradictory choices but two phases of a single strategy, a strategy that has long underpinned Iran's survival, strength, and continuity and will continue to do so in the future.