Now that the conflict has moved beyond the initial phase of high-intensity operations aimed at quickly imposing a new political reality, the greatest strategic mistake would be to continue analyzing developments through the lens of the war's opening days. In the first phase, the US and Israel sought to create a strategic shock and rapidly impose their desired political outcome. However, the failure to achieve those objectives has made continuing the same approach increasingly costly and strategically ineffective. Under these circumstances, Washington may shift from high-intensity warfare to a low-intensity war of attrition, one designed not to defeat Iran quickly, but to gradually wear down its military, logistical, economic, and social strength.

Within this framework, the relative reduction in direct pressure on Israel, resulting from its more limited role in this phase of the conflict, should not be interpreted as its withdrawal from the war. Rather, the division of labor between the US and Israel appears to have changed. While the US assumes the primary military role in maintaining direct pressure on Iran, Israel is using the opportunity to rebuild its military capabilities, repair damage, and reconstitute its forces. With Israeli elections approaching in October, this situation may also benefit Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu politically, allowing him to project an image of Iran remaining under pressure while the US bears most of the costs of the conflict.

Israel's reduced direct involvement also carries another important consequence: it frees part of the US air defense capacity for broader regional deployment. When Israel itself was under direct attack, a significant portion of US air defense resources had to be dedicated to protecting it. Reduced direct hostilities against Israel now allow Washington to focus more of its air defense systems on protecting US bases and military infrastructure across the region. In this way, the US seeks both to sustain offensive pressure on Iran and to strengthen its defensive posture, thereby reducing the effectiveness and cost imposed by potential Iranian retaliation.

This shift makes the conflict increasingly multi-layered. Logistics has become a critical front. The Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman are now the principal theaters of competition. Under these conditions, the decisive factor is not simply firepower but the ability to sustain it. Pressure on transportation routes and road infrastructure, alongside efforts to restrict maritime routes, may be intended to disrupt logistical chains and increase the cost of moving personnel and equipment. The ultimate objective is to separate Iran's domestic capabilities from the southern battlefield and gradually erode its capacity to sustain military operations.

Under these circumstances, Iran's response cannot be confined to defending against limited attacks. From the outset of the conflict, one of Tehran's strategic principles has been to regionalize the costs of aggression. Countries that provide bases, infrastructure, and operational facilities enabling US military operations against Iran cannot expect to remain entirely insulated from the consequences of the conflict.

From this perspective, strikes against US military and logistical infrastructure, as well as economic and service infrastructure in regional countries, are not viewed solely as military actions against Washington but also as measures capable of imposing direct political costs on host governments. As the cost of hosting US forces and bases rises, social and political pressure on governments in the southern Persian Gulf states could also increase. Under such circumstances, continuing to support US operations without cost becomes more difficult, potentially prompting regional governments to adjust their policies to avoid becoming direct theaters of war.

This is the logic behind regionalizing the conflict: if the US has brought the war from its own territory into the region, its costs should not fall exclusively on Iran. The objective is not necessarily to expand the conflict indiscriminately but to demonstrate to regional governments that facilitating US operations against Iran carries direct costs and consequences. Within this framework, pressure on regional infrastructure because of the US military presence can become part of a broader effort to alter the political calculations of regional states.

Alongside this process, the war of attrition has another critical front: society. If the US cannot defeat Iran through a decisive blow, it may seek to gradually increase the costs of continuing the conflict by shifting pressure from the battlefield to the economy and society. Pressure on living standards, rising costs of living, disruptions to transportation and supply chains, and uncertainty over when the war might end could, if prolonged, erode social capital.

A society that initially serves as the foundation of defense and resistance may, under sustained economic pressure and without a clear prospect for ending the conflict, begin to face new questions. In a war of attrition, the adversary can exploit the accumulation of such pressures to weaken domestic cohesion and shift the battlefield from the military domain to society itself. Preserving social capital therefore becomes as important as preserving military capability.

To navigate this phase, Iran requires a multi-layered strategy: maintaining offensive and defensive capabilities, strengthening logistical resilience, reducing infrastructure vulnerabilities, preventing the full cost of the war from falling on people's livelihoods, and increasing the cost of the US military presence for both Washington and its regional hosts. In this context, regionalizing the costs of war could become one of the most important tools for changing strategic calculations.

A war of attrition will become a strategic failure for the US only if the cost of sustaining it rises for Washington and its regional allies while Iran preserves its strike capability, logistical networks, and social cohesion. At this stage, the issue is not merely maintaining the ability to fight but ensuring that the opposing side cannot continue the conflict without paying a price. A new balance will emerge only when the US and regional governments conclude that continuing down this path is no longer a limited operation against Iran but the continuation of a conflict whose costs are distributed across the region.