In a surprise move, Emmanuel Macron became the first senior Western official to visit Damascus since Julani, Syria's interim president, came to power in late 2024. During the visit, Macron sought to portray France as "Syria's old friend." In a symbolic, tourism-style gesture, he visited the Umayyad Mosque and dined at a restaurant in Damascus's historic district. The available evidence, however, indicates that the trip was driven less by engagement and cooperation than by France's domestic and foreign challenges, particularly its diminishing role in the strategic landscape of West Asia. It can already be said that Macron is effectively incapable of fulfilling the promises he made to Syria's self-proclaimed leaders.

Syrian Refugees: Macron's Electoral Card Ahead of Domestic Political Competition

During the visit, without acknowledging France's role in Syria's crises, from the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) to the present, Macron attempted to present himself as Syria's savior. One of the central themes of his remarks was the issue of Syrian refugees and their repatriation from France to Syria.

France, one of the primary destinations for refugees, particularly from Africa and West Asia, hosts a significant Syrian refugee population. As extremist movements have gained ground in Western societies, including France, opposition to refugees has effectively become one of the main tools of electoral competition.

Members of Macron's Renaissance party are entering the political contest at a time when the French president has achieved little of note in the economy, domestic policy, or France's global standing and now faces serious challengers. This is particularly significant given that, following a court ruling, Ms. Le Pen, one of the ruling party's principal rivals, is eligible to participate in the election.

Against this backdrop, part of Macron's objective in visiting Syria appears to have been to demonstrate determination in resolving the issue of Syrian refugees, a matter that could become a political asset for the ruling party in the next election.

An Attempt to Return to the Stage: France Sidelined in West Asia's Strategic Landscape

Although Macron's visit to Damascus sought to invoke France's historical role in West Asia, including the legacy of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the reality is that Paris no longer plays a decisive role in regional developments.

Even in Lebanon, the country's affairs are being addressed through the 14-point Iran-US understanding on the one hand and the trilateral US-Lebanon-Zionist regime negotiations on the other, while France has effectively been excluded from both processes.

In the Palestinian issue, developments in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, Iran-US negotiations, and other major regional dossiers, France, along with other European countries, has been reduced to a marginal player.

Given the upcoming meeting between Trump and Julani, which could deliver the final blow to France's traditional regional role, Macron's trip to Damascus before attending the NATO summit in Türkiye appears intended to preserve at least a minimal French presence in West Asia. Yet Syria's fragmentation into disparate territories, together with the occupation by the US, Türkiye, and the Zionist regime, has effectively stripped the visit of any meaningful value for either Paris or Macron personally.

The significance of the visit for Macron becomes even clearer considering that France is also struggling within its traditional sphere of influence in Africa. Most recently, relations between Paris and Burkina Faso have further deteriorated, with France facing the prospect of expulsion from the country.

Grand Promises, Limited Capacity: Macron's Inability to Meet Julani's Expectations

Although Macron made sweeping economic promises in an effort to project French influence in Syrian society amid competition with the US, the Zionist regime, Türkiye, the UK, Germany, and several Arab countries, Julani likewise sought to amplify the importance of the visit. By highlighting issues such as economic recovery, attracting foreign investment, and claiming an agreement to receive eight French Airbus aircraft, he attempted to portray himself as capable of solving the country's problems and reinforcing his fragile hold on power. In reality, however, Macron lacks the ability to deliver either on Julani's objectives or on his own stated promises.

First, Syria's ruling authorities lack genuine stability and effective sovereignty. Rather than governing all of Syria, they are essentially the self-proclaimed rulers of part of Damascus. On the one hand, portions of the country are administered autonomously without recognizing the central government, while on the other, the civil war continues across Syria. Moreover, the record of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's crimes has created serious obstacles to foreign relations with this self-proclaimed government.

Second, Syria is effectively divided among occupying powers and external actors, including the US, the Zionist regime, Türkiye, and several Arab states. Under such conditions, there is fundamentally little room for France to play a meaningful role.

Third, Syria's foremost issue today is the Zionist regime's occupation. Julani himself asked Macron to help secure the regime's withdrawal from Syrian territory. However, the French leadership's dependence on Zionist lobbying has made such a demand impossible to realize. This was evident during the visit, as Macron refrained from condemning the occupation or taking any meaningful position on the issue.

Taken together, Macron's visit was above all a public relations exercise intended to project the image of France's continued relevance in the strategic landscape of West Asia. In practice, however, Paris, like other European countries, no longer possesses decisive influence, not only in West Asia but in broader global affairs as well, and is now paying the price for surrendering its strategic independence to the US and the Zionist regime.