The upcoming election may be Netanyahu's most significant political test since the October 7 operation. Unlike in the past, when he relied on his image as Israel's "security leader" to weather political crises, security has now become his greatest political vulnerability.

Recent polls published by Maariv and the Lazar Research Institute indicate that the governing coalition remains below the 61-seat threshold needed for a majority. Most surveys project Netanyahu's bloc winning 48 to 51 seats, while the opposition would have a stronger chance of forming a government if it remains united.

These figures point not only to a potential electoral defeat but also to the erosion of Netanyahu's political capital. One Maariv poll found that 55% of respondents believe he should step down as leader of Likud—a significant figure for a politician who has dominated Israeli politics for more than two decades.

Could this situation push Netanyahu toward escalating regional crises?

Historically, the answer is not a simple yes or no. Netanyahu has repeatedly treated security as his strongest electoral asset. Whenever the political climate has turned against him, he has sought to shift public attention from domestic issues to external threats. This pattern has been evident in relation to Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran's nuclear file.

Today, however, circumstances are different. First, the Israeli public has not forgotten the intelligence and security failures of October 7. Second, after months of war, Israeli society is increasingly concerned about the economic and human costs of further conflict. Unlike in the past, there is no guarantee that a new security crisis would boost Netanyahu's popularity.

Iran remains one of the key variables in this equation. A renewed confrontation with Tehran could allow Netanyahu to once again present himself as a wartime leader. Yet such a scenario faces serious constraints, including Iran's potential response, the economic costs of war, US pressure to prevent a broader conflict, and opposition from parts of Israel's security establishment.

Alongside Iran, competition with Turkey has gradually become another major element of Israel's regional strategy. Following developments over the past year, rivalry over Syria's future, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the regional balance of power between Ankara and Tel Aviv has intensified. However, this competition is expected to remain centered on intelligence operations, diplomatic pressure, and proxy confrontation, with the likelihood of direct military conflict remaining low, at least in the short term.

Another key factor is the position of US. Contrary to common assumptions, Washington is more concerned with preserving regional stability and avoiding a conflict that could draw US into another crisis than with Netanyahu's personal political fortunes. While US supports Israel's security, it is not necessarily expected to back military action undertaken primarily for domestic political purposes.

The October election is not merely a contest among Israeli political parties; it is also a referendum on Netanyahu's security record. If current polling trends continue, he will have to find a way in the coming months to reshape public sentiment. Whether that comes through diplomatic achievements, limited military operations, or heightened regional tensions remains unclear.

What is clear is that until election day in the occupied territories, every regional security development should be assessed not only through its military dimensions but also through the lens of Netanyahu's electoral calculations.