One of the most significant consequences of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US and the establishment of the ceasefire has been the changing nature of competition in the Persian Gulf. Throughout the war, the Strait of Hormuz effectively became a bilateral issue between Iran and the US. Despite repeated pressure from Washington, neither the southern Persian Gulf states, nor European countries, nor NATO members were willing to participate in efforts to reopen the Strait. Even Donald Trump’s public criticism of US allies failed to change that position. With the end of the war and the opening of the political window, however, the alignment of actors is gradually shifting. If not properly understood, this shift could become Iran’s most significant strategic challenge in the post-war period.

What is unfolding today in the Persian Gulf is not merely a series of isolated political or security statements. The joint statement by the US and the southern Persian Gulf states, the proposal for a Southern Corridor, and Emmanuel Macron’s declaration that France is prepared to cooperate in clearing mines from the Strait of Hormuz all signal the emergence of a new phase of competition. The objective is not simply to keep shipping lanes open, but to establish new security arrangements that would limit Iran’s ability to again leverage the Strait of Hormuz’s geopolitical significance.

The importance of this issue became even clearer when Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi responded to Macron’s remarks by stating: “Under the memorandum of understanding, mine clearance in the Strait of Hormuz will be carried out exclusively by Iran, and no other country will, in principle, be permitted to undertake such an operation.” He also warned France that the regional situation is sensitive and complex and stressed that Paris should not add to those complexities through such positions. Tehran’s response indicates that the issue is not merely a technical mine-clearing operation. The central concern is preserving Iran’s authority and jurisdiction over the security management of the Strait of Hormuz and preventing the emergence of arrangements that would erode that position.

Perhaps the most significant post-ceasefire development has been the changing composition of the actors involved. During the war, the Strait of Hormuz was an issue between Iran and the US, and Washington failed to persuade other actors to become directly involved. With the opening of the political window, however, the issue is gradually becoming regional and even international in scope. Virtually all major global actors want the Strait to remain open, but their primary objective extends beyond ensuring freedom of navigation. They seek to establish conditions under which any future closure of the waterway would become impossible or extremely difficult.

If this trend continues, the central contest will no longer be over whether the Strait of Hormuz is open or closed, but over who sets the future security rules governing this strategic passage. From this perspective, US efforts to build consensus among the southern Persian Gulf states, define new maritime security arrangements, and bring European actors into the issue can all be seen as components of a unified strategy to alter the geopolitical balance in the Persian Gulf.

Within this framework, it can also be argued that, from the US perspective, the memorandum of understanding was not merely an instrument to halt the war. It also created an opportunity to shift competition from the military battlefield to the realms of politics, diplomacy, and security arrangements, an arena in which Washington hopes to pursue, at lower cost, the same objectives it failed to achieve through military means.

Accordingly, Iran has now entered a different phase of competition. In this stage, the principal threat stems not merely from military operations but from coalition-building, institution-building, the pursuit of legal and international legitimacy, and the internationalization of security arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz.

Under these circumstances, Iran’s foremost priority is to recognize that strategic competition has shifted from the battlefield to the process of shaping the post-war security order. If the objective of this new phase is to gradually constrain Iran’s geopolitical capabilities through coalition-building, institution-building, and the internationalization of security arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz, then Iran’s response must be designed to compete effectively at that same level.

Maintaining military, security, political, and legal initiative; preventing the consolidation of new realities; strengthening engagement with influential regional and extra-regional actors; and, above all, safeguarding Iran’s position and authority in managing the security of the Strait of Hormuz through the full range of available instruments should form the core of Iran’s post-war strategy. At this stage, just as success in the political process was important, decisive success in preventing the emergence of arrangements that would gradually weaken Iran’s geopolitical capabilities will be equally critical to preserving the balance of power in the Persian Gulf.