The latest developments in the Persian Gulf should not be viewed merely as a series of military incidents or temporary tensions between Iran and the US. Rather, they represent the first strategic test following the memorandum of understanding signed by the two countries to manage the crisis and prevent further escalation.

Yet Washington’s actions after signing the MoU have posed a fundamental question for analysts: If the US accepted Article Five of the memorandum, why has it simultaneously continued, through political, security, and regional coalition-building measures, to pursue efforts aimed at limiting Iran’s geopolitical leverage in the Strait of Hormuz?

The answer to this question is key to understanding Washington’s new strategy.

The recent war demonstrated that the Strait of Hormuz remains Iran’s most important geopolitical lever in regional dynamics. Despite its extensive military capabilities, the US failed to neutralize this leverage, while Iran demonstrated both the will and the capability to influence this strategic waterway—a factor that played a significant role in preventing Washington from achieving some of its political objectives.

For this reason, Washington appears to have shifted its strategy from direct military confrontation to efforts aimed at reshaping the political, legal, and security balance in the Persian Gulf. Building regional consensus, strengthening alliances with the southern Persian Gulf states, internationalizing the Strait’s security, and promoting alternative transit routes can all be understood within this framework. In other words, the objective has not changed; only the tools have.

A more important question is why Washington continues to regard this course of action as low-cost. The answer lies in the concept of deterrence.

Deterrence is not merely about preventing war. It is effective only when it also discourages the other side from pursuing actions against a country’s strategic interests. If, after a political understanding is reached, the same objectives continue to be pursued through different means, it raises the question of whether deterrence has sufficiently altered the other side’s strategic calculations.

The reality is that no political agreement, by itself, prevents changes in the other side’s behavior. What changes state behavior is the assessment of costs and benefits. Whenever there is a perception that new geopolitical realities can be created without paying a meaningful price, the incentive to continue along the same path will only grow.

From this perspective, responding to efforts to alter the geopolitical balance cannot be limited to issuing statements or diplomatic protests. Deterrence becomes credible only when political, economic, legal, diplomatic, and defense instruments are employed in a coordinated manner to increase the cost of unilateral actions and reshape the other side’s strategic calculations. The purpose of deterrence is to prevent the consolidation of new realities by raising their political and strategic costs.

Under such circumstances, legal, political, and diplomatic efforts will also be more effective when backed by a credible, multidimensional deterrence strategy, one that conveys the message that any unilateral attempt to alter the geopolitical balance will not be a low-cost undertaking, but rather a costly course of action with no lasting gains.

Accordingly, it is necessary to make serious use of the instruments that, during the war, reduced US resilience and contributed to shifting the course of events from military confrontation to political negotiations. The managed closure of the Strait of Hormuz, along with comprehensive measures against any effort to establish alternative transit routes designed to limit Iran’s geopolitical leverage, should be at the top of decision-makers’ operational agenda.

By exerting both real and psychological pressure on global energy markets, such measures would significantly increase the cost of US efforts to constrain Iran’s geopolitical capabilities and, in practice, strengthen Iran’s deterrence.

If such an approach takes shape, legal, political, and diplomatic initiatives would proceed from a much stronger position, confronting the other side with the reality that, as before the ceasefire, Iran continues to possess both the determination and the capability to comprehensively counter any action that harms its interests.

What can strengthen stability is not merely written agreements, but the emergence of a durable calculation among all parties that the cost of changing the existing balance outweighs any potential gains.