The cancellation of the planned Iran-US meeting in Switzerland cannot be viewed merely as a technical pause in negotiations. It comes as Israeli attacks on Lebanon continue and have even intensified, developments that are inconsistent with the spirit and provisions of the recent memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war and opening a new path for negotiations. This coincidence has once again brought a key question to the forefront: Does the suspension of talks increase the likelihood of a return to war?

At first glance, any disruption in negotiations may appear to return the parties to the starting point of the crisis. A closer examination, however, suggests that the equation is far more complex than drawing a direct link between delayed talks and an immediate return to war.

The most important reality is that today's conditions differ from those that existed before the war. The recent memorandum of understanding emerged after the US, as the initiator of the aggression, concluded that continued military action could not achieve Washington’s political objectives as initially envisioned. Recent remarks by the US president partly confirm this reality. Responding to critics who accused him of being soft on Iran, Donald Trump stated that continued bombing had produced no gains for the US and would not even have led to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. These comments represent more than a political position; they reflect a cost-benefit assessment of continued warfare.

From this perspective, the reduced likelihood of renewed war stems less from a change in US political will than from the limitations exposed by the previous conflict. The 40-day war demonstrated that military force does not necessarily produce political outcomes and that the costs of continued conflict can outweigh its benefits. This reality should be viewed as one of Iran’s strategic achievements, one that can provide both practical and psychological leverage in future negotiations.

That said, this assessment does not mean the danger of war has disappeared. Recent developments suggest that the primary threat is not a deliberate, planned war, but rather a conflict driven by crisis dynamics. Continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon, which are clearly inconsistent with existing understandings, could trigger a chain of reactions that becomes increasingly difficult to control.

The US is widely viewed as the principal party responsible for implementing the understanding and restraining Israeli behavior. Continued attacks could therefore raise serious questions about Washington’s commitment or ability to uphold the agreement. In this context, postponing negotiations may not necessarily reflect opposition to dialogue itself, but rather an effort to push the US toward playing a more effective role in crisis management.

The outlook ahead should therefore be assessed through two simultaneous realities. First, the likelihood of a new US-initiated war remains low, as neither regional conditions, nor the state of the global economy, nor the lessons of the previous war provide sufficient incentive for another large-scale confrontation. Second, the risk of unintended escalation remains serious—particularly if developments on the ground outpace political understandings.

For this reason, the suspension of the Geneva talks should not be interpreted as the collapse of diplomacy. Just as negotiations emerged from realities on the ground, their continuation requires at least a minimum level of trust and implementation of initial commitments. The future of negotiations will depend less on the parties’ declared intentions than on their ability to manage field-level crises and prevent further escalation.

The most significant strategic mistake would be to view every deadlock or delay in negotiations as proof of an inevitable return to war. Recent months have shown that war is neither a low-cost option nor a guaranteed path to success for any side. At the same time, unchecked crises can create conditions in which actors are drawn into conflict unintentionally. The future of the region will therefore be determined not between “war or negotiations,” but between “crisis management or crisis escalation.”