Barack Obama, the former US president, raised several noteworthy points in his first serious response to the recent understanding between Tehran and Washington. In an interview with ABC News, he said he doubted the new agreement would differ fundamentally from the 2015 nuclear deal, which, according to him, was achieved after years of difficult negotiations but was undone when Donald Trump withdrew from it. He also stressed that believing problems can be solved through “intimidation or bombing” is a strategic mistake and that even an agreement that cannot eliminate all disagreements should be welcomed because preventing war is itself a significant accomplishment. Obama concluded by emphasizing the need to learn from past experiences and warning against repeating the same errors.

At first glance, these remarks may appear to be merely another defense of the JCPOA or criticism of the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from it. However, looking beyond the headlines, the real significance of the interview lies elsewhere: in the renewed divide among America’s strategic elites over how to deal with Iran.

This point, however, should not lead to a misunderstanding. The disagreement between Obama and Trump is not over US interests. Both sought to contain Iran’s power, preserve America’s strategic dominance in the region, and safeguard US national interests. The Obama administration also did not abandon pressure on Iran. Broad sanctions, economic pressure, intelligence operations, and efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence all continued during his presidency. Therefore, Obama’s remarks should not be portrayed as idealistic or peace-oriented. The disagreement is not over objectives but over methods of achieving them, and it is precisely this distinction that carries strategic value.

Two Strategies, One Objective

Obama’s recent remarks should be viewed as a defense of a particular school of thought in US foreign policy, not merely a defense of the JCPOA. In essence, he argues that if, after years outside the JCPOA, a maximum-pressure campaign, intensified sanctions, escalating military tensions, and ultimately a costly war, Washington has once again found itself compelled to return to negotiations, then it must be acknowledged that reliance on military power alone has not produced results different from those achievable through diplomacy.

This does not mean that Obama’s view of Iran has changed. He still believes Iran’s nuclear and strategic capabilities should be constrained and continues to regard agreements as tools for securing US security and interests. The difference between him and Trump is that Obama sees negotiations as more effective than war and views pressure as a means to reach an agreement rather than a prelude to collapse or complete capitulation by the other side.

By contrast, Trump’s approach was based on the assumption that escalating economic pressure, political isolation, and military action could force Iran to accept conditions unattainable through ordinary negotiations. From this perspective, the disagreement between the two presidents is not over pressure itself but over different methods of applying pressure. This point is highly important for understanding US policy. In Iran’s political discourse, changes of administration in Washington sometimes create expectations of fundamental changes in US objectives. Experience, however, has shown that overarching goals generally remain constant, while the instruments and operational priorities change.

What Iran Should Learn from This Disagreement

Nevertheless, the consistency of objectives does not make these differences insignificant. On the contrary, understanding such distinctions is one of the requirements of a smart foreign policy. Contrary to common perceptions, major powers are not entirely monolithic. Within the US decision-making structure, there have always been debates over the balance between war and diplomacy, the costs and benefits of military intervention, the effectiveness of sanctions, and the management of international crises. These disagreements sometimes influence strategic decisions as well.

Obama’s remarks should be interpreted within this framework. From the standpoint of US interests, he argues that war is a costly and unpredictable instrument and that if a large portion of security objectives can be achieved through an agreement, that path is preferable to war. This argument is not rooted in sympathy for Iran but in a different assessment of US interests.

For Iran, this is the principal lesson. Neither should these differences be ignored by viewing America as a completely homogeneous entity, nor should they be exaggerated to the point of assuming that a change in president transforms the nature of US policy. Both interpretations can lead to miscalculation.

Successful diplomacy requires, above all, a precise understanding of the other side. A country that accurately understands its rival’s decision-making structure can use differences in methods to reduce the costs of confrontation, expand opportunities for negotiation, and better secure its national interests. From this perspective, Obama’s recent interview is significant. More than a defense of the JCPOA, it is a sign of the continuation of a long-standing debate within US policy circles over the limits and effectiveness of military power, a debate that the recent war has once again revived.

Perhaps the most important message of these remarks for Iran is this: in international politics, exploiting a rival’s strategic divisions is only possible when those divisions are analyzed realistically, neither through optimism toward one faction nor by ignoring the genuine differences between them. The art of foreign policy begins precisely at this point, where understanding differences in methods becomes a tool for better securing national interests without harboring illusions about the consistency of the other side’s objectives.