At a time when the region has witnessed simultaneous tensions on multiple fronts in recent months, from the 40-day war that began on February 28 and its consequences, to earlier conflicts and developments related to Lebanon, complex diplomatic and legal files are also underway. Against this backdrop, indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States over a possible draft understanding, alongside sensitive issues concerning sanctions relief, the release of frozen assets, and the future of the nuclear file, have become a central focus of political developments.

At the same time, strategic regional issues such as the status of the Strait of Hormuz and the legal framework governing it have once again come under the spotlight. Iran continues to emphasize its sovereign rights in its territorial waters while also insisting on the principle of “safe passage and responsible joint management” in peacetime. Discussions have also emerged regarding the role of regional countries and extra-regional pressures in this area.

In this context, a detailed interview was conducted with Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Minister for Legal and International Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. The discussion comprehensively examined developments ranging from nuclear negotiations to regional security dynamics, from the Strait of Hormuz to legal efforts in international forums, and from mechanisms for releasing assets to the prospects for potential agreements.

The full interview follows:

Last night, we witnessed developments that many observers considered significant. While Israel issued evacuation warnings for areas of Beirut’s southern suburbs, Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters simultaneously issued evacuation warnings to residents of certain areas in northern Israel. Following these reciprocal warnings, it appeared that Israel stepped back from some of its actions or at least reconsidered its calculations. What is your assessment of these developments? Can this behavior be interpreted as evidence of the effectiveness of mutual deterrence and a shift in the balance on the ground? Also, given that nearly two weeks have passed since the escalation in Lebanon, why did Iran enter the phase of reciprocal warnings at this point rather than earlier?

Gharibabadi: Actions taken by the Zionist regime in Lebanon are naturally violations of the ceasefire. The Islamic Republic did not enter late; the necessary warnings had already been delivered to the other side in recent days. However, what happened yesterday was not a warning—it was Iran’s intention to act. That is the important point. Therefore, there was no delay. Had an order not been issued yesterday to halt these attacks, the Islamic Republic of Iran would certainly have taken action, particularly in light of the statement issued by Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters and the other messages the Foreign Ministry conveyed through different channels to the relevant parties.

First, their actions constituted a ceasefire violation, and the Islamic Republic stated that they must stop; otherwise, we would take proportional and reciprocal measures. Why proportional and reciprocal? Because the ceasefire currently in place after the 40-day war also includes Lebanon. This was part of the understanding that was reached. If this agreed ceasefire is violated in any part of the agreed geography, the Islamic Republic of Iran will naturally respond.

If a ceasefire is established, what geographical scope does it cover? Does it apply only to Beirut and the southern suburbs, or to all of Lebanon? From Iran’s perspective, what actions would constitute a violation of the ceasefire?

What we have said is Lebanon. We have stated that the ceasefire includes Lebanon. Even regarding the end of the war, the discussion concerns all fronts, including Lebanon. We did not specify a particular part of Lebanon, although the area of dispute is clear and it is evident which parts of Lebanon are involved.

Another point is that, in my view, after the message issued yesterday by the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Americans and the Zionists concluded that hostilities could resume.

The Zionists and the US are responsible for these developments. The United States bears responsibility because it is supposed to guarantee that the Zionist regime does not violate the ceasefire. Both parties therefore have responsibilities. There was a risk not only of renewed hostilities but also of moving away from an understanding in the political and negotiating sphere. These are two possible reasons.

There were certainly other factors as well, related to domestic public opinion in the US and the Israeli regime, as well as their internal decision-making processes, which led to the decision to stop. The Islamic Republic demonstrated that it is highly determined and serious about supporting its allies, and we will certainly not abandon them.

The Strait of Hormuz lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, and under international law and the law of the sea, coastal states have the right to exercise sovereignty over their territorial waters.

Mr. Gharibabadi, you recently visited Oman and discussed the Strait of Hormuz and related cooperation with Omani officials. According to reports, Oman welcomed expanded legal and technical cooperation in this area. At the same time, reports have emerged about increased US pressure on Oman and efforts by Washington to limit its cooperation with Iran. Given the historical and strategic ties between Tehran and Muscat, how do you assess Oman’s approach to such pressure? Will Oman continue its balanced and independent policy toward Iran? Also, in light of recent regional developments, what is your outlook for the future of the Strait of Hormuz and Iran-Oman cooperation in securing and managing this strategic waterway?

Gharibabadi: The Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as Oman, as coastal states, have the right to exercise sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Some argue that the Strait is an international waterway and therefore subject to the law of the sea. No one denies that straits considered international waterways are subject to a specific legal regime. However, the reality is that the Strait of Hormuz lies entirely within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. Under international law and the law of the sea, coastal states have the right to exercise sovereignty over their territorial waters. Internal waters, of course, are part of a state’s territory. Even the International Court of Justice, in a ruling issued years ago, emphasized the sovereign rights of coastal states over their territorial waters.

The Strait of Hormuz lies within the territory of Iran and Oman. The exercise of sovereignty cannot be arbitrary, discretionary, or intended to restrict commercial shipping or vessel traffic without justification. Sovereignty may be exercised when there is a concern that vessels may disrupt the order or security of coastal states. In such cases, coastal states may exercise their sovereign rights.

Exercising sovereignty here means imposing certain regulations and restrictions. This is precisely what the Islamic Republic did during the war. The Strait of Hormuz could naturally have been exploited by our enemies and their supporters to endanger our national security, and from this perspective Iran adopted the necessary decisions and restrictions.

In peacetime, however, we are not talking about preventing vessels from passing, stopping everyone, or requiring case-by-case negotiations. That is not the case. Rather, what we seek in peacetime is safe passage.

Safe passage has several dimensions. First, commercial vessels should be able to transit the Strait smoothly and efficiently. Second, the responsible coastal states—namely the Islamic Republic of Iran and Oman, have a duty to ensure safe and secure passage. Third, it must also be guaranteed that vessels do not jeopardize safety and security during transit. If we have evidence that a vessel intends to disrupt our order or security, we can naturally impose restrictive measures. Such actions are not contrary to the law of the sea. Although we are not a party to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, such measures are not inconsistent with international law, even in peacetime.

Charging fees for maritime services is also not contrary to the law of the sea. The 1982 Convention itself provides that coastal states may collect fees in exchange for specific services. “Specific services” means that one cannot simply impose a transit fee on every passing vessel without providing any service. That is prohibited. The Islamic Republic is not seeking transit tolls or passage fees. Rather, we seek compensation for services provided jointly with Oman. These services include navigation assistance, search and rescue, security services, safety services, and environmental cleanup services in the event of pollution. Therefore, these measures are not inconsistent with the law of the sea.

If some countries object, it is understandable. For more than four decades they benefited from passage through the Strait free of charge, and the Islamic Republic never obstructed vessel transit. Even military ships passed through.

Some of these countries threatened us while transiting the Strait. Naturally, when we now seek to establish regulations, impose restrictions, or charge fees for services, they are displeased and create controversy. But this cannot cause us to abandon the pursuit of our rights, especially since these measures do not violate international law. What matters is that vessels retain the right of passage through straits connecting two seas under normal conditions. We fully recognize that. The arrangements we are drafting and will certainly announce will not be inconsistent with international law, although they may not be welcomed by some countries.

Parliament has proposed a legal plan regarding the Strait of Hormuz. How could it complement these measures?

Gharibabadi: Parliament should explain that itself, because I am not familiar with the details of the proposal.

So the Foreign Ministry is not aware of the parliamentary proposal? Is there any cooperation between Parliament and the Foreign Ministry on this matter?

Gharibabadi: The Foreign Ministry was invited to one meeting, but the proposal has not yet been formally sent to us for comment, and I believe it has not yet been sent to the government either. In any case, if Parliament passes a law, all state institutions will implement it. However, our recommendation is that all actions regarding the Strait of Hormuz be coordinated within the framework of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Agencies should not act independently because this is a national issue. If the government intends to act, it should consult the armed forces, revolutionary institutions, and Parliament. Likewise, if Parliament intends to act, it should seek the views of revolutionary and military institutions as well as the government. Such synergy is essential because this is a sensitive and important national issue.

At a minimum, the Islamic Republic of Iran insists that 50% of its frozen assets be made available immediately upon the signing of the memorandum of understanding, with the remainder released after a reasonable period.

In recent days, discussions have emerged about a draft understanding or possible agreement between Iran and the US. Trump has also referred to revisions and review of details of the draft. Given the public sensitivity surrounding the issue, where do the negotiations currently stand? What are the main areas of disagreement or negotiation, and what subjects do the proposed revisions primarily concern? In light of recent regional developments, can we speak of a broader political agreement or even an agreement aimed at ending tensions and conflicts? What is your outlook for these talks?

Gharibabadi: Naturally, once a text is finalized, it can become the basis of an understanding. Several points are important. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers a text final only when our concerns and interests are fully reflected in it. One of those concerns is the permanent and immediate end of the war on all fronts, including Lebanon. This is a fundamental and key issue.

A second point concerns lifting the naval blockade. If Iran is expected to take measures regarding the Strait of Hormuz to ensure freedom of navigation, then the naval blockade must also be lifted. This is not simply a one-for-one exchange. I have seen some media outlets ask whether lifting the blockade equals reopening Hormuz. No, it is not that simple. Any step we take in Hormuz could be matched by various measures.

Another issue tied to our interests is the release of Iran’s frozen funds. These are our own funds. They do not belong to Western countries or the US. We are not negotiating for aid or money from them. These are Iranian funds that the US has illegally frozen and prevented the relevant countries from making available to Iran. The funds remain in those countries and their banks. This is a key issue. The precise amount to be released initially and the amount to be released later is negotiable. However, at a minimum, the Islamic Republic insists that 50% of these funds be released immediately upon signing the memorandum of understanding, with the remainder released within a reasonable period, which from our perspective should not exceed one or two months.

Whenever the text meets our interests and, most importantly, the end of the war is declared and we are not exposed to another war, the understanding can be considered final from Iran’s perspective and our approval can be communicated to the other side.

One of the public’s major concerns following the human, economic, and infrastructure losses caused by the war is compensation. Does the Islamic Republic have a specific plan to pursue legal claims and seek reparations from the parties responsible? Through what legal and international channels would this be pursued, and how realistic is the prospect of obtaining compensation?

Gharibabadi: War-related damages are very important to us. This was an unlawful act of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and these countries bear responsibility under international law, both the US and the Zionist regime.

We insist that any text must address war damages and provide compensation to Iran. This must be included in the text. The format, amount, and financial mechanisms for payment will be determined through negotiations, including the 60-day negotiation period following the signing of the memorandum of understanding.

Another issue that is important to us and must be included in the text is the lifting of all unilateral sanctions, including both primary and secondary/extraterritorial sanctions. All such sanctions must end. This is a fundamental and key principle. The normalization of Iran’s status at the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council is another issue that must be addressed.

The current review process is intended to ensure that our concerns and interests are fully reflected in the text. During this period, the US may send messages requesting revisions, which can lengthen the review process. We have also requested revisions to certain parts of the text.

Therefore, whenever the relevant authorities conclude that the text serves our interests and, most importantly, that the end of the war has been declared and we are not at risk of another war—although we remain prepared to defend ourselves—the understanding can be considered final and Iran’s approval can be communicated to the other side. How long this process will take, however, I cannot say.

Is there still a long way to go before the text is finalized?

Gharibabadi: I truly cannot provide a timeline. Whenever we are satisfied, the understanding can be considered final. I cannot say whether it will take days, a week, or more. We will finalize only a text that serves our interests.

As we move toward finalizing the text, we are also monitoring US behavior.

Do you see political will in the US this time?

Gharibabadi: We focus on whether the text serves our interests. A country may have political will but still produce a weak text. First and foremost, the text must be precise and appropriate, addressing all of our concerns, interests, and rights.

One of the issues I mentioned regarding our interests is the protection of our rights. This should be added to the list. Our rights in various fields, including the nuclear field, must be reflected in the text.

So first we need a suitable text. Political approaches also matter. Once there is a text, the question becomes whether there is the will to implement it. It is possible to reach an understanding on paper but encounter implementation problems because the necessary political will is absent and the agreement becomes merely symbolic or temporary.

As we move forward on finalizing the text, we are also monitoring US conduct. We have made considerable progress on the text, but we are also observing behavior, such as the actions the Zionist regime sought to take in Lebanon. We are pursuing both tracks simultaneously—the text and the conduct. Had that behavior continued, it could have cast a shadow over the entire process and halted the talks.

Under the current draft understanding, which has not yet been finalized, the US would commit to releasing all of Iran’s frozen financial assets in line with progress in the negotiations.

Recently, Speaker Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Araghchi traveled to Doha in what appeared to be a rapid and coordinated visit, prompting various speculations about its objectives and achievements. Some media reports also claimed that the funds would not be transferred directly to Iran but that a mechanism would allow Iran to procure essential goods using those credits. Could you explain the purpose of the trip and its main achievements for the Islamic Republic?

Gharibabadi: As I mentioned, various formulas and mechanisms have been proposed to ensure that the Islamic Republic can gain immediate access to a substantial portion of its frozen assets once the memorandum of understanding is signed. One proposal involves a role for Qatar, through a specific mechanism designed to facilitate implementation of the understanding and prevent the negotiation process from stalling.

Under this mechanism, while the US commits to issuing and implementing the necessary orders and measures to unfreeze Iran’s assets, required funds could initially be provided through alternative mechanisms and later replaced as the frozen assets are released.

Some people may be interested in the technical details, while others care mainly about whether Iran can access its resources immediately after signing the memorandum of understanding. If Iran’s funds can be made available through a reliable and secure mechanism, regardless of the channel used, that could be an acceptable solution.

It should be emphasized, however, that such a mechanism does not in any way relieve the US of its obligations. Under the current draft understanding, which has not yet been finalized, the US commits to releasing all of Iran’s frozen financial assets in proportion to progress in the negotiations.

The important point is that the period envisioned for this process is no more than 60 days. In other words, within this two-month period the US must take all necessary steps to unfreeze Iran’s financial resources. We are therefore talking about a limited and defined timeframe, not the implementation period of a final agreement, which could be much longer.

As a result, if the necessary financial resources are made available through alternative mechanisms at the outset and simultaneously with the signing of the memorandum of understanding, this could facilitate and accelerate implementation. The trip and consultations in Qatar took place precisely within this framework, and from our perspective the mission can be considered successful.

One of the major issues in Iran’s nuclear file concerns enriched uranium stockpiles and how they should be managed. While the Islamic Republic has repeatedly emphasized that it will not agree to removing these stockpiles from the country, various proposals have circulated regarding their management or possible transfer, including references to Russia, China, and more recently Kazakhstan. What role, if any, does Kazakhstan play in this equation? Has it actually been discussed as a practical option, or is it merely media speculation? More broadly, what scenarios are under consideration, and what is the Islamic Republic’s definitive position? Also, to what extent is there consensus among Iran’s decision-making institutions on enrichment and the management of uranium stockpiles?

Gharibabadi: The issues of sanctions relief and nuclear-related matters belong to the second phase of negotiations, within the same 60-day period I referred to. Naturally, at this stage the Islamic Republic will not discuss negotiating details or publicly outline its principles.

If the understanding is signed and negotiations formally begin, the Islamic Republic’s positions will be clearly presented within that framework. At present, various individuals and countries are making statements and speculating, but we cannot comment on such speculation. Whether comments come from the Director General of the IAEA or from countries such as Kazakhstan or others expressing interest or proposing ideas, these remain proposals and viewpoints from different parties.

What matters to us is the official position of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which will be articulated at the appropriate time within the framework of the nuclear negotiations.

New Negotiation Details: 50% of Frozen Assets Must Be Released Simultaneously with the Understanding

Western media have reported claims that during the recent conflict and the 40-day war with Iran, the US used the Starlink network to support and guide drone operations and certain attacks. If true, this could have significant legal and international implications. From the perspective of international law, how actionable are such claims? Could the use of commercial satellite infrastructure in military operations constitute a violation of humanitarian law or the law of armed conflict?

Gharibabadi: First, it must be emphasized that the military action itself constituted unlawful aggression in violation of international law and the UN Charter. Therefore, any legal analysis must begin with this central issue—the act of military aggression directed against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of an independent UN member state.

Within that framework, issues such as the use of tools like Starlink should be viewed as subsidiary aspects of that aggression. They may be operationally important, but they remain secondary compared to the aggression itself.

Nevertheless, the use of such tools without regard for state sovereignty and without compliance with the laws of the country where they are used raises legal issues under international law. In this regard, regulations within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) had already been under consideration, including in response to requests by the Islamic Republic of Iran, requiring compliance with the laws and regulations of host states when using such technologies.

Accordingly, the use of Starlink inside Iran without the necessary authorizations has been considered problematic under domestic law and certain aspects of international law and is subject to legal follow-up. Cases have been filed with relevant bodies, including the ITU, and the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology has also pursued the matter.

We are examining what additional legal avenues may be available. This issue is not limited to military applications. Similar concerns were previously raised regarding the use of such tools during domestic unrest, which we also view as inconsistent with domestic law and certain international legal considerations. Overall, whether in military or non-military contexts, we regard this issue as legally actionable and intend to pursue it through international mechanisms.

Given the 12-day conflict last year and more recently the 40-day war, during which a number of senior commanders and civilians were killed, what concrete legal and international measures has the Islamic Republic taken to pursue these cases? What documentation and evidence has Iran submitted to international legal bodies, and through what channels have these efforts proceeded? What is the current status of these cases?

Gharibabadi: Let me begin by noting that, under a decision taken within the system, primary responsibility for pursuing these matters internationally was assigned to the Presidential Legal Office. For whatever reason, it was decided that this responsibility would not be assigned directly to the Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry remains committed to using all diplomatic capacities, embassies, and international forums to defend the country’s rights.

Regarding the 12-day war, I believe the responsible institutions should provide a detailed report explaining what documentation was prepared, how it was compiled, and where it was submitted. For our part, the Foreign Ministry prepared approximately 1,000 pages of detailed and documented materials and registered them as official documents at the United Nations, including with the General Assembly and Security Council. We also circulated them to various countries and launched an extensive explanatory campaign.

We initiated a broad effort of documentation and legal follow-up, not only regarding the 12-day war but also regarding the domestic unrest of Dey 1404, during which we submitted numerous reports and documents concerning terrorist and sabotage activities and the role of foreign supporters to the UN and other international bodies.

The same process continued during the 40-day war. We collected documentation, including evidence concerning the role of certain neighboring countries in the Persian Gulf region that, unfortunately, allowed their territory or airspace to be used by the aggressors. Under international law, particularly the 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, such conduct can be considered aggression itself, not merely assistance.

More than 100 diplomatic notes were sent to these countries and to the UN Security Council. All flights, routes, and details concerning the passage of aggressor aircraft—including times, routes, and points of entry and exit—were carefully documented. This body of evidence has now been published in book form and will soon be made available to the public, researchers, and the legal community.

In another part of this documentation effort, the aggression by the Zionist regime and the US against Iran was examined separately. More than 1,000 pages of reports and correspondence were prepared, including over 200 official communications with international bodies concerning damages, violations of international law, human rights violations, and violations of the UN Charter.

Some reports also documented the consequences of the aggression in detail, including attacks on civilian sites such as residential homes, hospitals, relief centers, infrastructure, and educational facilities. Specific cases—including the martyrdom of the Supreme Leader, the Dena vessel case, the Minab school, attacks on oil reserves, and other incidents—were documented separately.

Finally, a comprehensive legal report exceeding 100 pages and consisting of nine sections was prepared. It systematically documents and analyzes these actions, crimes, and violations of international law and has been registered as an official document with the UN Security Council.

In sum, even when it is not directly tasked with doing so, the Foreign Ministry considers it its duty to defend the country’s interests. We regard this as a responsibility because, alongside the sacrifices of the armed forces and the deaths of civilians, children, women, and above all the martyrdom of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, we have a duty to document and pursue these crimes.

For this reason, we declare our readiness to coordinate with the responsible institutions in completing documentation and strengthening legal follow-up in international forums, and this process will continue.