Reports suggesting that a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States is close to being signed, alongside recent comments by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that the world would hear “good news in the coming hours, especially regarding the Strait of Hormuz,” may represent more than merely progress in negotiations. They can also be seen as reflecting a more consequential shift in the strategic equations governing the international order. Although it remains unclear whether this process will ultimately lead to a durable agreement, what is now unfolding cannot be understood without examining the consequences of the 40-day war.

For years, one of the principal instruments of pressure against Iran rested on the assumption that a combination of military threats, sanctions, and security pressure could ultimately force the Islamic Republic into a strategic retreat, or even “surrender.” This was not merely political rhetoric; it constituted part of a broader strategic doctrine in Washington and Tel Aviv. Months before the outbreak of the war, Donald Trump repeatedly and explicitly spoke of Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” a phrase that made clear the ultimate objective was not simply to alter Tehran’s tactical behavior, but to reshape its strategic calculations through the application of hard power.

Yet the war produced an outcome contrary to those expectations. Despite extensively employing their military and security capabilities, the United States and Israel failed to eliminate the most critical component required to realize this doctrine: Iran’s “capacity to respond.”

That capacity is not confined solely to the military sphere. Rather, the mobilization of Iran’s political, social, security, economic, and military capabilities in response to external aggression created a situation for its adversaries that can best be described as one of “strategic paralysis.” If the strategy of coercing Iran into surrender was ever to succeed, its prerequisite would have been disabling Iran’s ability to impose reciprocal costs, a capability that could otherwise deprive any military action of being low-cost for the opposing side. The preservation of that capability fundamentally altered the equation.

In reality, the war’s most important outcome emerged not merely on the battlefield, but at the level of strategic perception. The conflict demonstrated that the use of military force against Iran, contrary to assumptions that had prevailed for decades, does not necessarily lead to the outcomes envisioned by its architects. In other words, the theory that Iran could be compelled into surrender through threats or the application of hard power has now come under serious challenge.

At the same time, the war underscored another reality: Iran’s position in regional and global equations extends beyond what can be measured solely through economic or military indicators. The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz once again demonstrated that energy security, global trade, and regional stability cannot be defined without accounting for Iran’s role. This is precisely where the significance of Rubio’s remarks regarding the Strait of Hormuz becomes clear: even the opposing side is now compelled to speak from the standpoint of “crisis management,” rather than merely the application of pressure.

From this perspective, if a memorandum of understanding is ultimately signed between Tehran and Washington, it should be viewed less as the product of a purely diplomatic compromise and more as the result of a shift in the balance and calculations that emerged after the war. Any potential understanding would not mark the beginning of a new reality, but rather the unveiling of a truth the war brought into sharper focus: by preserving its capacity to respond, Iran has not only weathered a costly phase, but has also seen its strategic standing in regional and global equations undergo a significant elevation.