It would not be far from reality for someone to argue that present-day Iran, given the combination and concentration of actual and potential threats it faces, is in an exceptional and unprecedented situation, and that at least in the history of the past half century, one can scarcely point to a period in which the political system has been so deeply preoccupied with the issue of survival and continuity. The dominance of wartime conditions in Iran over roughly the past year, and especially during the past three months, has been the result of coercion imposed by oppressive extra-regional powers, creating an atmosphere of insecurity and suspension across the country. Under such circumstances, reconsidering which grand strategy Iran and its political establishment should adopt as the preferred path of governance has become a vital and profoundly important issue.

Wartime State: Meaning and Necessity

Recently, a media debate centered on the concept of a “wartime state” or a “national defense state” has emerged in Iran, with some analysts discussing the meaning and necessity of such a state. Even Masoud Pezeshkian stated explicitly in a speech last week: “We must adopt a wartime posture.” That statement in itself may suggest that the Fourteenth Administration has realized that the grave and complex conditions confronting the country require a redefinition of the functions and responsibilities of the governing apparatus. Nevertheless, what Pezeshkian means by a “wartime posture” may not necessarily correspond to what some theorists have in mind when discussing this concept.

For example, Dr. Ali Abdollahkhani, Deputy for Theoretical Affairs and Acting Head of Theory at the Vice Presidency for Strategic Affairs, recently presented an extensive discussion titled “The Wartime State” during the roundtable “Government of Consensus; Government of War and Patriotic Defense.” His argument is an attempt to formulate a theory of governance for today’s Iran in accordance with current realities. The theory seeks to define the present condition of the Islamic Republic not as a collection of scattered crises, but rather as a “state of survival”, a condition in which the primary issue is no longer development, political competition, or even public welfare, but the preservation of national existence itself.

The significance of this discussion lies in the fact that, for the first time, part of Iran’s official state structure is attempting to introduce a kind of “political theory of survival” into the literature of governance, that is, to redefine politics around the binary of “existence or nonexistence.” Within this framework, the state is no longer merely an institution for administering society; it becomes a mechanism for guiding the country through an existential threat.

In his remarks, Abdollahkhani attempts to distinguish among three concepts: a “state at war,” a “wartime state,” and a “warlord state.” In his formulation, a state at war is simply a government that temporarily adopts wartime behavior because of an external conflict, as Iran did during the 1980s. A warlord state, by contrast, is one in which war becomes part of the state’s identity and logic of survival, placing it in a condition of perpetual hostility. What he advocates is the middle model: the “wartime state”, a government that, even in the absence of open warfare, organizes its logic of governance around managing a condition of survival.

On the surface, this formulation appears to be an attempt to avoid the excesses of militaristic extremism. At the same time, however, it carries a significant shift in the understanding of the state and politics in Iran. In this view, security and survival become the central concepts of politics, while all other objectives of governance are defined beneath them.

To better understand this theory, one must pay attention to its foundational assumptions. According to this framework, Iran today simultaneously faces three structural threats:

First, a multilayered external war involving military, economic, sanctions-related, and intelligence pressures;

Second, the relative collapse of the global order and the world’s entry into an anarchic era in which international rules have weakened;

And third, what is described as a “crisis-driven domestic existence”, namely, the accumulation of economic, social, infrastructural, and livelihood crises.

Based on this analysis, Iran is not merely confronting ordinary governance problems; rather, it has entered a situation in which many of the “reference pillars of national survival” are simultaneously under pressure. These pillars include territorial integrity, national unity, social order, public livelihood, vital infrastructure, the political system, and national power.

Questions Regarding the Theory of the Wartime State

It must be acknowledged that parts of this analysis display a considerable degree of realism. The world has indeed entered a more turbulent era. The Ukraine war, the Gaza crisis, the escalating rivalry between the United States and China, the weakening of international institutions, and the expansion of hybrid and multidimensional warfare all demonstrate that national security in the twenty-first century is no longer merely a military concept. Today’s wars can simultaneously operate through sanctions, financial disruption, cyberwarfare, psychological pressure, and infrastructural sabotage. From this perspective, such an analysis is not simply ideological exaggeration; it rests on a genuine perception of global transformations. Likewise, a country that sees itself exposed to an existential threat cannot be governed solely according to the ordinary logic of development. History also shows that many states, during periods of severe crisis, have moved toward greater centralization, security prioritization, and national mobilization of resources.

Yet this is precisely where the main issue begins. The critical question is whether the existence of threats necessarily means that a country has entered a “state of survival.” Nearly all governments in the world today face varying degrees of external threats, economic crises, social polarization, and geopolitical pressure. If all such conditions are interpreted as a “state of survival,” then almost every state would have to transform itself into a wartime state.

In reality, the most important theoretical challenge facing this idea is the possibility that the state of emergency becomes permanent. Once “survival” is turned into the central concept of politics, almost any issue can be defined through the lens of security. Under such circumstances, development, freedom, political competition, civil society, and even public welfare may continually be deferred to an undefined future, because the prevailing argument will always be that “this is a time for survival, not a normal time.” This is precisely the point at which the theory of the wartime state approaches traditions in political philosophy where the “state of exception” becomes the norm. Discussions surrounding twentieth-century garrison-state theories consistently carried the warning that if a government permanently defines itself as facing an existential threat, it will gradually securitize every sphere of society. In such a condition, the economy, culture, media, universities, and even everyday life become arenas of national security.

Another danger is that the line separating a “wartime state” from a “warlord state” may in practice be far thinner than it appears in theory. Abdollahkhani certainly attempts to distinguish between the two, but the reality is that any state that continuously perceives its survival to be under threat, and prolongs or even normalizes emergency conditions, may gradually become a permanent reproducer of crisis and exceptionalism, even if its original intention was merely to navigate through a period of danger.

Moreover, the issue of “social consent” receives less attention in this theory than it arguably deserves. In today’s world, survival does not simply mean preserving borders or maintaining a political structure. More than ever before, national power depends on the quality of governance, the possibility of meaningful public participation, public trust, social hope, the ability to attract and retain human capital, and the preservation of elites. If the wartime state, even unintentionally, leads to the erosion of social capital, the emigration of elites, the restriction of public participation, and the broad securitization of society, it may create short-term stability while ultimately weakening the very foundations of survival in the long run.

Despite all these considerations, one cannot deny that the idea of the wartime state also carries a real warning: that Iran has entered a period that can no longer be managed solely through ordinary and everyday models of governance. Accumulated crises, external pressures, infrastructural vulnerability, and economic erosion are realities that require a reassessment of the state’s capacity and the manner in which the country is governed. But the fundamental question is how far this reassessment should go, and how a balance can be maintained between the “necessity of survival” and the “preservation of ordinary social life.”

In short, the fate of the theory of the wartime state depends on the answer to precisely this question: Is such a state merely a temporary model for navigating a period of threat, or is it intended to become a permanent philosophy of governance in Iran? If the answer is the latter, then the issue will no longer be survival alone; rather, the question will become what aspects of society, politics, and public life will ultimately be sacrificed in the process of preserving that survival.