The visit by US President Donald Trump to China and his meeting with Xi Jinping unfolded amid extensive controversy, with the positions, objectives, and conduct of both sides regarding global developments going far beyond a routine diplomatic exchange. Alongside efforts to manage tensions, the trip reflected a significant trajectory in the evolution of the international system, one that is gradually moving away from a US-led unilateral order toward a more multipolar structure. This shift is not the result of convergence with Washington, but rather the outcome of years of China’s resistance to the US-imposed order, ultimately compelling Washington to adjust its tone and behavior toward Beijing.

Within this context, despite Trump’s claims that China is aligning with US demands, announcements such as the finalization of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing, China’s official positions on the Persian Gulf Strait of Hormuz, the illegality of aggression against Iran, and its reaffirmation that Taiwan is an internal matter all indicate that Beijing continues to adhere firmly to its strategic red lines.

China’s authority: result of saying “no” to US

In his meeting with Xi Jinping, Trump stated: “You are a great leader. People don’t like me saying this, but I’ll say it anyway because it’s true!” Such remarks, along with his repeated praise of China and its leader, are less an indication of convergence between the two countries and more a reflection of a deeper reality: China’s achievements in pursuing a strategy of saying “no” to the United States.

Although China has based its foreign policy on expanding economic relations and engagement with countries around the world, it has simultaneously emphasized strengthening its indigenous military and defense capabilities, an approach that has led to reduced dependency and ultimately to greater political and economic independence. At the same time, Beijing has consistently demonstrated a firm response in defining and defending its red lines against the US.

What has prompted a figure like Trump to praise Xi Jinping is not Chinese submission, but rather Beijing’s insistence on resisting external interference and focusing on internal capacity-building, from maintaining the “One China” principle to asserting foreign policy independence, disregarding external pressure, and building global networks outside Western unilateral frameworks.

China’s growing influence worldwide, even among traditional US allies, confirms this reality. Today, European leaders, despite their rhetoric of sanctions and confrontation, regard engagement with Beijing as unavoidable. Visits by leaders such as Starmer, Macron, and other European officials to China clearly illustrate this trend.

Trump’s behavior in Beijing once again demonstrated that internal and external power-building across political, economic, security, and cultural domains, rather than reliance on external promises, is the path to becoming an influential global actor. For this reason, unlike his behavior toward Western allies, Trump refrained from displaying overt condescension in China and instead was compelled to praise China and its leadership.

Beijing as a peer power to United States

Although Xi Jinping attempted to manage tensions through remarks such as “building a constructive, stable strategic relationship between China and the United States is not merely a slogan” and that “China’s renaissance should coexist with the slogan of ‘Make America Great Again,’” Beijing’s conduct during the visit carried deeper messages.

China sought to present itself not as a subordinate actor but as a power on equal footing with the United States, signaling to the world that it is no longer a peripheral player but one of the core pillars of the emerging global order.

At the same time, China once again made its non-negotiable red lines explicit, from Xi’s firm warnings on Taiwan to the announcement of Putin’s official visit to Beijing and China’s firm positions on Iran and developments in West Asia. Collectively, these actions reflect Beijing’s broader strategy to consolidate a new multipolar global order.

Trump: a president caught between domestic crisis and foreign setbacks

On the other side, Trump’s behavior reflected a different reality: he did not arrive in Beijing as the undisputed leader of a unilateral order, but as a president burdened by internal crises and external failures.

Above all, Trump appeared focused on showcasing economic achievements in order to, on the one hand, create a psychological shock that could help manage parts of the US economic crisis following strategic miscalculations tied to the war against Iran, and on the other, to obscure heavy failures in cases such as Ukraine, Gaza, and the Ramadan War.

His insistence on bringing “the world’s largest economic delegation,” comprising 30 prominent business leaders, came at a time when polls indicated a crisis of public legitimacy and domestic pressure, particularly in Congress, was increasing due to the economic consequences of his war-driven policies.

This behavior closely resembles recent visits by European officials to China, aimed at leveraging Beijing’s economic capacity to ease domestic crises and contain social discontent.

Strait of Hormuz: realities on the ground versus US narratives

Following his meeting with Xi Jinping, Trump claimed that the Chinese president wanted an agreement on Iran and the continued openness of the Strait of Hormuz, even asserting that Beijing would not supply Iran with weapons and would only continue purchasing oil. US Secretary of State Rubio similarly claimed that China opposes the militarization of the Strait of Hormuz and the imposition of tariffs in the passage.

However, these narratives are not consistent with either ground realities or China’s official positions.

First, Iran has demonstrated in recent years that it possesses indigenous defense and military capabilities, a fact confirmed during the Ramadan War. Therefore, Tehran-Beijing relations are fundamentally defined by economic, political, cultural, security, and regional cooperation within the framework of the 25-year strategic agreement, rendering Trump’s claims baseless.

On the other hand, China has officially condemned the military aggression by the US and the Israeli regime against Iran, describing it as illegal. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has also emphasized the need for an immediate end to military conflict, stressing that such a war should never have occurred and has no justification for continuation.

While Beijing, due to economic considerations and its relations with Arab states, emphasizes the importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, it has consistently underlined the legitimacy of Iran’s positions and the illegality of US and Israeli aggression. China sees itself as being “on the right side of history”, a position that has also made it one of the key beneficiaries of maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz.

Tehran–Beijing convergence: beyond Washington’s pressure

China’s strategy toward Iran is so deeply rooted and stable that even during Trump’s visit to Beijing, the issue of oil sanctions on Iran or halting oil purchases from Tehran was not even placed on the negotiating table, an indication that Beijing is unwilling to participate in Washington’s maximum pressure campaign against Iran.

This approach stems from Iran’s regional and international standing and its role in the emerging regional and global order. Tehran and Beijing’s convergence has advanced to the point that, simultaneously with Trump’s visit, China also supported Iran’s positions in BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization meetings and emphasized the need to end US threat-based policies against Tehran.