In the complex arena of Iran-US confrontation, it seems a third strategy has emerged beyond the binary of war and negotiation, a strategy that can be called “economic pressure through the blockade of ports.” If the US did not achieve its goals in the 40-day military war against Iran, and if the path of negotiation has still not been able to impose Washington’s unilateral demands on Iran, the current effort is to create a gradual but effective erosion of Iran’s economic system and people’s livelihoods by restricting vital arteries of Iran’s international trade, especially through ports and export-import gateways. It is precisely here that the need to redefine the government’s role under new wartime conditions begins and becomes essential.
Government and Necessity of a New Battle Formation
During the 40-day war, the Iranian government managed to prevent severe shocks to critical markets with relatively cohesive management. Relative stability in the supply of essential goods, psychological control of the foreign exchange market, and minimal public confidence in access to consumer items showed that the government was prepared for such conditions in advance and that the country’s executive mechanisms have the capacity for mobilization and coordination in emergencies. According to experts, the government’s performance in managing the country during those difficult days was positive and commendable. However, with the ceasefire and the subsequent intensification of economic pressures through the trade siege, signs of turbulence gradually appeared in the markets: rising exchange rates, increasing gold prices, jumps in the automobile and housing markets, and noticeable fluctuations in consumer goods prices.
There is no doubt that external factors and externally imposed conditions have played a significant role in this situation. But these developments, beyond “external pressure,” may also indicate a gap in the government’s “structural preparedness” to face the economic siege scenario. In other words, although the executive branch maintained an acceptable formation during the difficult days of war, it appears that for the current protracted and complex economic warfare, it has not yet reached the desired level of preparedness commensurate with emerging threats. This is not to suggest negligence or incapacity on the part of the executive branch, but rather the emergence of a new layer of enemy conspiracies that perhaps required innovative foresight and design. This is where the necessity of a paradigm shift in the country’s economic governance emerges. The direction of this paradigm shift is to design and implement innovative solutions to safely navigate the economy through these new bottlenecks.
If the government’s battle formation was successful in the 40-day war, that does not mean the same formation is effective today. The government must adopt a different battle formation appropriate to the level and nature of the new economic warfare. A wartime government is not merely a hardworking or diligent government; it is one in which priorities are redefined, alternative paths are discovered, new initiatives are deployed, decision-making is accelerated, and structures are rearranged in an agile and targeted manner to remain effective under conditions of maximum pressure. Such a government could even easily consider a cabinet reshuffle and changes in senior management, replacing non-aligned or low-energy elements with fresh, highly motivated forces.
If the bullying US government has supposedly blocked Iran’s ability to export oil directly, can we not use economic diplomacy to leverage the capacities of countries like Iraq, India, and China for indirect oil exports? Can the approach already taken in Pakistan, compensating for the blockage of Iranian ports by using the ports of that neighboring country, be extended and developed? The rapid design and implementation of such problem-solving initiatives is precisely what is meant by renewing the Iranian government’s battle formation. Such a government must have several key characteristics:
Initiative in circumventing restrictions. In a world where financial and trade networks are under the supervision and control of great powers, merely relying on traditional trade routes leads nowhere. Developing economic diplomacy with aligned countries, using barter mechanisms, utilizing local currencies, and actively engaging in regional supply chains are among the solutions that can neutralize part of the siege pressure. The experience of countries that have been under similar sanctions shows that “flexibility in exchange instruments” is one of the keys to survival under such conditions.
Strategic focus on leading sectors. In Iran’s economy, oil and agriculture possess unique capacities for creating value and meeting domestic needs. The Ministries of Oil and Agriculture are at the forefront of this reconfiguration. In the oil sector, diversifying customers, using innovative sales methods, and reducing dependence on limited export routes can stabilize foreign currency revenues. In agriculture, moving quickly toward regional markets and securing essential needs such as livestock inputs from them can strengthen food security and price stability for goods like meat, poultry, and eggs, which are currently in disarray.
Decisive action against corruption and rent-seeking. Siege conditions are the most favorable environment for exploiters, hoarders, and economic corrupt elements. On the other hand, under siege, any inefficiency or corruption multiplies the impact of external pressure. Channels of corruption, hoarding, and hidden collusion in foreign contracts not only waste national resources but also undermine public trust. Unfortunately, there are concerning reports of some such collusion with foreign parties, and both the government and supervisory bodies must address them. Meanwhile, the role of the judiciary in swift and decisive action against violators is an essential complement to government measures; but the initiative must begin from within the government.
Managing expectations and public trust. Economics is not merely a set of numbers and indicators; it is heavily influenced by public perceptions and expectations. In a situation where news of siege and economic pressure is being disseminated, if the government cannot provide a convincing narrative of the situation and draw a clear horizon, markets will quickly become prone to emotional behavior. Accurate, honest, and timely communication, alongside practical measures, can prevent the formation of inflationary expectations. For example, the puzzling silence of responsible government officials regarding price surges in the automobile market fuels public uncertainty and disrupts citizens’ psychological security.
It must be accepted that the economic siege strategy, now seriously on the US agenda, is a “silent war” but deep and perilous, a war whose main battlefield is the people’s livelihoods and social stability. In such a battle, victory is achieved not through a one-off measure but through a series of intelligent, coordinated, and continuous governance policies led by the government. The Iranian government, drawing on its crisis management experience in the recent war, is now in a position to prepare itself more thoroughly for this new phase through a serious reconfiguration.
What is most urgently needed today in confronting the economic siege strategy is the government’s “innovative action.” Such action and innovation must be created and continuously strengthened across all branches of government, especially in key drivers such as the Ministries of Oil, Economy, Industry, Mining and Trade, Agriculture, the Central Bank, and the Plan and Budget Organization. If this approach is properly adopted, the economic siege will act not as a paralyzing threat but as a historic test for enhancing the country’s internal capacities. The government of Masoud Pezeshkian, which demonstrated during the 40-day war that it could adopt an appropriate and successful operational formation to manage the economy, can now also, by mobilizing resources and providing centralized, targeted direction of its services, adopt a formation suited to the enemy’s dangerous strategy.