The summit can be viewed as more than a routine regional meeting. It was the first major gathering of Persian Gulf Arab leaders following the recent US-Israeli war against Iran—a war that not only reshaped Tehran-Washington dynamics but also challenged the entire security framework of Persian Gulf Arab states.

Perhaps the central question is whether these countries are now moving toward revising their security strategies, or whether they still assume that alignment with external powers ensures their safety.

Cost of a Failed Security Doctrine

For decades, Persian Gulf security architecture has been built on the assumption that the presence of external powers—particularly the United States—ensures stability. This led to expanded foreign military bases, massive arms deals, and in some cases closer ties with Israel.

However, the recent war once again demonstrated that this assumption is flawed. In any major confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, the first region exposed to risk is the Persian Gulf itself. Energy infrastructure, shipping routes, financial centers, airports, and coastal cities all lie within the direct radius of escalation.

In other words, external security dependence may create an apparent protective umbrella, but it simultaneously places these countries on the front line of crisis and war.

The Jeddah summit reflects this awareness. Support for the Iran–US ceasefire and backing Pakistan’s mediation efforts indicate growing recognition of the costs of escalation. Persian Gulf states have witnessed firsthand how conflict threatens development plans, investment strategies, and long-term economic transformation.

Projects discussed at the summit—such as a Persian Gulf-wide railway network, transnational pipelines, early warning systems, strategic reserves, and maritime security frameworks—signal a shift in thinking. Security is no longer defined solely by weapons procurement or foreign military bases, but by economic resilience, regional connectivity, and collective stability.

Toward Regionalized Security

Still, the key question remains whether this shift has matured into a genuine regional security framework. Evidence suggests the answer is partially yes at the conceptual level, but not yet at the operational level.

Gulf Cooperation Council states increasingly recognize that external powers cannot provide sustainable security for a region whose own actors are not fully integrated into its architecture. Imported security is inherently temporary and conditional.

From this perspective, regional security cannot be achieved without Iran. Iran is not only the largest geographic power on the northern shore of the Persian Gulf but also a decisive actor in energy, trade, the Strait of Hormuz, and regional military balance. Any security arrangement that excludes Iran—or is designed against it—will ultimately prove fragile and costly.

This does not negate existing political differences, geopolitical rivalries, or historical mistrust. The question, however, is what the alternative is: continued reliance on external arrangements that repeatedly bring the region to the brink of war, or gradual movement toward regional dialogue and shared security mechanisms.

The realistic answer is that no single side can establish lasting security alone. Persian Gulf states appear increasingly aware that proximity to the United States and Israel has not necessarily made them safer. It may have provided short-term advantages, but it has also increased vulnerability. When tensions escalate between Iran and the United States or Israel, Persian Gulf states are inevitably drawn into the crisis cycle, even against their will.

A Moment for Security Recalibration

The Jeddah summit may therefore represent the beginning of a broader strategic reflection for southern Persian Gulf states: that regional security must be built within the region, not imported from outside.

While it is too early to speak of a full strategic shift, signs of change are visible—preference for ceasefires over confrontation, emphasis on mediation, focus on economic integration, and efforts to reduce collective vulnerability.

If this trajectory continues, the next logical step would be a broader regional dialogue involving Iran, based on mutual respect, non-interference, maritime security, energy cooperation, crisis management, and shared development.

Such a path is not simple, but it is less costly than repeating cycles of war and dependency.

The recent war may have delivered a key lesson to Persian Gulf Arab states: security cannot be purchased, outsourced, or delegated. It is only sustainable when neighbors—despite their differences—choose to view part of their destiny as shared.

If Jeddah carries a message, it may be precisely this: the time has come to rethink the security order of the Persian Gulf.