The fourth session in the specialized “Ramadan War” series, titled “The Persian Gulf Security Puzzle After the Ramadan War,” was held by the Tin Shia Think Tank in cooperation with the Center for Economic Diplomacy and the House of Thinkers, featuring Dr. Hamidreza Fartoukzadeh, a faculty member at Malek Ashtar University of Technology.

Corporatocracy and Geopolitical Coding of Region

Dr. Fartoukzadeh outlined his views on corporatocracy and the geopolitical coding of the region. He emphasized that one of the key analytical frameworks for understanding power structures in the southern Persian Gulf is “corporatocracy”—a system defined as a complex network of corporations, banks, and financial institutions operating through layered informational, security, legal, and media cover, and, when necessary, backed by the US military.

This network both feeds on and safeguards the petrodollar system. Crucially, it operates beyond the traditional nation-state model. Major oil companies, as producers of petrodollars, and large contractors in development and arms projects, as their consumers, form a cycle that simultaneously satisfies local rulers’ ambitions and serves the interests of the North Atlantic power structure. The primary beneficiary of this system, however, is the US Treasury, which manages petrodollar recycling to contain inflation stemming from dollar issuance.

Nature of “Nationless States” in the Persian Gulf

Dr. Fartoukzadeh also elaborated on the concept of “nationless states” to describe political units in the southern Persian Gulf. These entities, he argued, cannot be explained within the Westphalian nation-state model but are instead shaped by Anglo-Saxon geopolitical coding. Their sources of power are not endogenous, but rather tied to transnational corporate mechanisms.

He cited Bahrain—historically an integral part of Iran for over two millennia—as an example of such geopolitical engineering. This artificially separated political unit, shaped under corporatocratic influence, simultaneously functions as a US military base for operations against Iran and as a political platform for pushing resolutions against Iran in the UN Security Council. He stressed that the overwhelming majority of Bahrain’s population has no share in the ruling tribe’s political power—a tribe that rose to dominance through colonial-era arrangements. Other Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, he noted, exhibit similar patterns of corporatocratic capture.

Iran’s Geopolitical Anxiety: Historical Roots

Dr. Fartoukzadeh used the term “geopolitical anxiety” to describe the persistent pressures exerted on Iran’s national power since the 19th century. This condition dates back to the arrival of the East India Company and was reinforced during the “Great Game” between Britain and Russia, leading to the systematic weakening of Iran’s national capabilities. At critical historical junctures, these pressures have been reproduced in new forms.

He identified key drivers of Anglo-Saxon sensitivity toward Iran as:

Iran’s strategic geographic position controlling the northern Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman;
its territorial, historical, linguistic, and cultural depth;
its potential influence over the petrodollar system;
its independent relations with China;
and its opposition to the Israeli regime’s security dominance in the region.

Critical Junctures in Geopolitical Anxiety

He outlined major historical turning points in this trajectory, including:

The separation of Herat and the imposition of the 1857 Treaty of Paris;
The 1907 St. Petersburg Agreement partitioning Iran;
The 1908 D’Arcy oil concession limiting Iran’s share of revenues;
The Great Famine during World War I (1914–1919);
Obstruction of industrial development during the Pahlavi era;
The 1953 coup overthrowing Prime Minister Mossadegh;
The separation of Bahrain in 1971;
Support for Saddam Hussein and anti-Iranian groups;
Expanding sanctions, including CISADA (2010);
The June 2025 (12-day) war;
And the February 2026 aggression

Security Puzzle: Paradox and Fluid Insecurity

A key feature of Dr. Fartoukzadeh’s analysis was his depiction of the regional security environment as an “iceberg,” where visible events represent only a fraction of deeper, decisive layers. In such an environment, behavior often appears counterintuitive, shaped by conceptual inversions and linguistic distortions, increasing the risk of miscalculation.

The mismatch between the “regional façade” and the “extra-regional reality” of Persian Gulf political units creates significant room for strategic misperception. Similarly, the gap between nation-state appearances and corporatocratic realities can be misleading.

He argued that Iran faces neighboring entities whose tangible and intangible assets—land, airspace, coasts, ports, and infrastructure—are effectively at the disposal of North Atlantic military actors, enabling operations against Iran across military, intelligence, security, and economic domains. These entities often justify their role by claiming neutrality, arguing that it is the United States—not them—that is at war with Iran. He challenged the validity of this claim, asking whether a political unit can allow its territory and infrastructure to be used in war without bearing responsibility—and still be called a “country.”

This, he concluded, constitutes the core of the Persian Gulf security puzzle, facilitating the injection of “fluid insecurity” into the region by external powers.

12-Day War and Misinterpreted Signals

Dr. Fartoukzadeh also analyzed the recent 12-day war within the framework of a 2001 Pentagon directive—later revealed by General Wesley Clark—aimed at destabilizing seven countries. He argued that the formation of the “axis of resistance,” under the guidance of Iran’s leadership and General Qassem Soleimani, prevented the full realization of this plan.

He noted that Iran’s restraint in response to repeated Israeli actions—particularly the attack on its consulate in Damascus in April 2024—was interpreted by adversaries as weakness. While Iran refrained from retaliation to preserve regional stability, this restraint ultimately contributed to strategic miscalculation by its opponents.

In contrast, he pointed to Soleimani’s decisive response following the 2018 T-4 base attack, which deterred further escalation. He also cited remarks by Oman’s foreign minister regarding the Muscat negotiations, suggesting that Iran had signaled willingness for concessions, including reducing enriched material stockpiles and allowing inspections. These signals, he argued, were interpreted in Washington as signs of weakness.

He concluded that the “war of signals” plays a critical role in deterrence, as misinterpreted signals can embolden adversaries and increase the likelihood of aggression.