Nournews: Stephen M. Walt’s recent article in Foreign Affairs, titled “The Predatory Hegemon,” should not be seen merely as an academic critique of Donald Trump’s second administration. Rather, it represents an attempt to name a new doctrine in U.S. foreign policy—a doctrine that, if properly understood, sheds light not only on the future trajectory of the global order but also on the fate of sensitive confrontations such as the recent Iran–U.S. standoff.

Walt argues that Trump’s foreign policy cannot be explained through familiar frameworks such as “isolationism” or “classical nationalism.” What is emerging is a form of predatory hegemony—a model in which the United States uses its military, financial, and geopolitical superiority not to build a stable order, but to extract concessions, impose asymmetric deals, and demand public displays of compliance. In this worldview, the world is not a web of complex cooperation, but a zero-sum arena of hard bargaining, where what matters is not how much the total gains increase, but how much less the other side gets.

Within this framework, security becomes a conditional commodity. The U.S. security umbrella, from Europe to East Asia, is no longer a long-term strategic commitment but a lever for economic extraction. Military protection can be tied to trade deals, forced investments, or geopolitical concessions. Even “unpredictability,” traditionally considered a diplomatic weakness, is now turned into a weapon to enhance bargaining power. The message is clear: security is not guaranteed without additional costs.

A natural consequence of this approach is distancing from multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, where U.S. power is constrained by rules and norms. By contrast, bilateral negotiations are arenas where power asymmetry yields maximum returns. While this shift may produce tangible gains in the short term, it erodes America’s credibility capital in the long run—a capital accumulated over seventy-five years since World War II.

This is where Walt’s analysis gains strategic significance. If the United States shifts from a “provider of global public goods” to an “extractive actor,” allies will inevitably seek to reduce their dependence. Excessive pressure pushes countries toward diversification of partnerships; the rise of China, the activism of middle powers, and the formation of alternative coalitions must be understood in this context. A predatory hegemon may profit in the short term, but in the long term it forces others to seek escape routes.

The recent Iran–U.S. confrontation also bears the imprint of this logic. Maximum pressure, military threats, and diplomatic volatility are less about forging a durable agreement and more about producing a “symbolic victory”—a deal that can be presented domestically in the United States as a major achievement. Yet such an approach, rather than reducing structural tensions, often deepens mistrust and pushes regional actors toward alternative options. For Iran, this creates a dual reality: on the one hand, short-term and unpredictable pressures intensify; on the other, fractures within the Western order and the trend toward multipolarity open up new opportunities.

Walt’s core warning is that power is not only a function of economic size or military capability; it also depends on credibility, trust, and predictability. If the United States spends this invisible capital in exchange for immediate gains, it may extract concessions today, but tomorrow it will face a world less willing to follow its lead. In such a world, crisis management will be more costly, alliances more fragile, and deterrence more difficult.

“Predatory hegemony” is not merely a description of a governing style; it captures a historical moment in which the world’s largest power must choose between short-term gains and long-term position. The outcome of this choice will shape not only America’s future, but also the configuration of the global order in the coming decade and the position of countries such as Iran within it.