Nournews: At first glance, Donald Trump’s recent remarks about setting a “10 to 15 day” timeframe to determine the fate of an agreement with Iran appear to be a repetition of the familiar pattern of verbal threats and psychological pressure—an approach the United States has employed for years within its combined “pressure–negotiation” strategy. However, reducing these statements to mere propaganda tactics or diplomatic bargaining tools could be a dangerous analytical mistake. Under current field and strategic conditions, such deadline-setting is less a tool for crisis management and more a potential catalyst for miscalculation and, consequently, unintended and unpredictable events.

The current regional security environment differs significantly from previous periods. An unprecedented concentration of U.S. military forces, escalating overt and covert tensions, and the simultaneous continuation of diplomatic tracks have created a complex mix in which any incorrect message or ambiguous signal could trigger chain reactions. In this context, threatening rhetoric—especially when accompanied by a defined timeline—does not remain confined to media consumption; it directly enters the security calculations of the other side.

In this framework, recent strategic developments in Iran over the past two months should not be overlooked. Although the statement issued by Iran’s Defense Council—the highest policymaking body in military and defense affairs—did not explicitly mention “preemptive operations,” its language, assumptions, and direction were interpreted by many domestic and international strategic analysts as indicating a shift in Iran’s operational doctrine. This interpretation was later reinforced—and even implicitly confirmed—by some explicit remarks from political and military officials. The message was clear: Iran will not remain merely in a reactive posture in the face of direct or indirect threats.

The experience of the January unrest and the way U.S. threats were handled is a concrete example of this logic of active deterrence. At that time, Trump issued a direct message seeking to exploit Iran’s internal unrest, encouraging protesters to stay in the streets and seize government centers, while promising that “help is on the way.” However, after security forces regained full control and no practical action was taken by the United States, many observers concluded that Trump had stepped back from the operational phase despite reputational and political costs. The prevailing analysis was that Iran, based on overt threats and a preemptive doctrine, had adopted a specific operational posture that made any external operation highly risky and potentially uncontrollable. In such conditions, U.S. decision-makers preferred not to cross the crisis threshold—demonstrating that verbal threats do not necessarily translate into hard action, especially when costs are unpredictable.

Now, Trump’s return to deadline-driven and threatening rhetoric could create similar or even more complex conditions. Setting a specific timeframe, at a moment when the other side has signaled readiness for preemptive action, effectively shifts decision-making pressure from the political sphere to the security sphere. This is precisely where the risk of miscalculation increases—where a misunderstanding, an ambiguous signal, or a limited action can quickly escalate into a broader crisis, one that neither side may desire but that would be difficult to control.

Trump’s recent statement that “either we reach a meaningful deal or bad things will happen” carries contradictory signals rather than effective pressure. On the one hand, he speaks of positive talks; on the other, he issues vague threats of “bad things.” Such ambiguity, especially in a high-tension environment, may be the worst type of strategic signal—neither deterrent nor reassuring.

Past experience shows that media-driven deadlines, while potentially useful for domestic consumption and displays of power in front of cameras, are strategically more likely to generate crises than manage them. In an environment dominated by active deterrence and rapid-response calculations, playing with time and threats can produce consequences that are neither predictable nor easily containable.