At a time when politics and security have become intertwined to an unprecedented degree, the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be explained through linear models such as “threat–retreat” or “pressure–concession.” What is currently emerging in the statements and actions of the country’s senior officials reflects a dual-pillar strategic design: on the one hand, advancing a political and negotiating process to safeguard national interests; on the other, consolidating active deterrence against military threats. These two tracks are not defined in opposition to each other, but rather as complementary. Understanding one without the other leads to incomplete and flawed interpretations. The Leader’s recent remarks in his meeting with the people of Azerbaijan are meaningful precisely within this framework. The two key propositions he raised carry messages far beyond a momentary stance:

“They constantly say we have sent an aircraft carrier; a carrier is indeed a dangerous device, but more dangerous than the carrier is the weapon that can send that carrier to the bottom of the sea.”

And also: “The strongest army in the world may at times be struck so hard that it cannot rise again.”

These statements are not wishful descriptions, but a compressed summary of a strategic calculation regarding the real balance of power in the field.

Contrary to the widespread perception promoted in previous years—especially during the first presidency of Donald Trump—Tehran has not chosen the path of “managing through silence.” At that time, part of global public opinion viewed Trump as an unpredictable politician lacking conventional rationality and advised that direct confrontation with him would be costly. Today’s response is precisely the reverse of that approach: a direct challenge to the opponent’s calculations and a disruption of the cost–benefit image he has constructed in his own mind regarding military confrontation. This confrontation is less person-centered and more aimed at breaking the threat-based logic of the United States.

In this context, the role of the Zionist regime and its narrative-building cannot be ignored. Following recent regional developments, Benjamin Netanyahu has sought to convey to Western circles the proposition that Iran is in a state of erosion and weakness, and that a limited strike could alter the equation. The Leader’s remarks effectively target this narrative. The message is clear: Iran is not in a position of helpless defense, but stands in a state of active deterrence, and considers any calculation based on a “low-cost strike” to be invalid.

This message is not directed outward alone. Domestically, it also performs a dual function. First, it reassures the social body and citizens that the country is not only prepared to confront threats but also possesses a clear understanding of the field. Second, it serves as a warning to those currents, inside or outside the country, that have pinned their hopes on foreign intervention and its aftermath. The implicit reminder of bitter historical experiences, including Washington’s intervention in Iran’s internal affairs, underscores that repeating such scenarios under present conditions would be a dangerous illusion.

The simultaneity of these positions with the IRGC Navy’s exercises in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz further highlighted the operational dimension of this message. The temporary closure of the Strait and reports of drills targeting hostile vessels—including with long-range ballistic missiles launched from deep within the country—demonstrated that talk of “capability” has not remained at the level of rhetoric. Even without full disclosure of details, this level of information was sufficient to send a deterrent signal: the necessary tools to operationalize reciprocal threats exist.

On the other side of this equation, diplomacy continues with equal seriousness. The remarks of Abbas Araghchi following the second round of indirect negotiations in Geneva indicate that the political process has entered a more structural phase. Agreement on “guiding principles” for moving toward the text of a possible agreement, while not meaning an immediate deal, suggests that talks have moved beyond testing intentions and entered the design phase. Technical consultations with Rafael Grossi can be assessed within the same framework.

The key point is that Tehran has not allowed military threat to define the framework of negotiations. On the contrary, the message has been clearly conveyed that negotiation is a conscious choice to secure the rights of the nation, not a reaction born of fear. At the same time, any illusion regarding the possibility of imposing one’s will through force has been answered by the tangible display of deterrent capability.

Iran’s current strategy rests on a precise yet synergistic separation between the “negotiating table” and the “deterrence field.” Negotiation is not defined as a substitute for power, nor is power defined as an obstacle to politics. This calculated coexistence is precisely the point many external analyses have failed to grasp. At this juncture, Iran is neither bargaining over its security nor using security as a pretext to evade politics; rather, it is deploying both simultaneously in the service of securing national interests.