After the Second World War, Europe defined its security within the framework of structural dependence on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, effectively placing itself under the strategic umbrella of the United States. While this long-term reliance appeared to create deterrence, it gradually eroded Europe’s independent defense capacity and turned it into an actor dependent on decisions made in Washington.
Geopolitical developments in recent years, along with doubts about the extent of America’s commitment to defending Europe, have transformed this dependence into a strategic vulnerability. A return to the localization of security is now seen not as a political choice, but as a structural necessity.
Ariane Missile and Redefinition of Deterrence
Within this context, a proposal by ArianeGroup to develop a ground-based ballistic missile has been welcomed by countries such as France and Germany. At the same time, Berlin is planning large-scale purchases of low-cost combat drones in cooperation with European partners.
These measures are not merely about strengthening military arsenals; they represent a redefinition of deterrence in Europe. The continent has come to recognize that sustainable security is not possible without indigenous hard-power capabilities, and that political and economic independence without independent defense backing will remain fragile.
Decline of the Myth of Imported Security
The simultaneous rise in military budgets among global powers and the expansion of missile and drone technologies signal a shift in the pattern of the international order. In the emerging system, countries capable of independently producing and deploying defensive tools will be the decisive actors.
As a result, the model of “externally guaranteed security” is giving way to one based on domestic capacity. Europe’s experience has shown that reliance on an external power, at critical strategic junctures, can lead to structural defenselessness.
Western Duality on the Question of Deterrence
While Europe moves to strengthen its missile and drone capabilities, the same countries portray the development of defensive capabilities by others — particularly Iran — as threatening, and seek to link missile and drone issues to nuclear negotiations.
Tehran’s official position, including the emphasis by Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, is grounded in the principle that the country’s defense architecture is defined within national red lines and is not subject to negotiation. Historical experience has demonstrated that sustainable security is achieved not through unilateral restriction, but through a balance of power.
This dual approach by the West weakens the credibility of its claim that others’ indigenous capabilities constitute a “threat” and makes clear that the real standard is the preservation of unilateral superiority, not the safeguarding of peace.