The key question is whether this diplomatic signal serves as cover for buying time to complete offensive and defensive preparations, or whether it is primarily aimed at containing escalation cycles and controlling the costs of conflict.

Diplomacy as a tool for managing the arena

In strategic literature, diplomacy is not merely a pathway to resolving disputes; it is also a tool for managing the competitive arena. Powers often keep negotiation channels open even at the peak of tensions in order to control uncertainty and preserve operational options. From this perspective, an offer to negotiate can serve a dual function: testing the other side’s intentions and adjusting the timing of developments.

Within such a framework, the assumption of “buying time” is a plausible one. Any military actor planning a complex operation requires the completion of a chain of intelligence, operational, logistical, and defensive preparations. Especially in scenarios where the risk of a severe counter-response exists, upgrading missile defense capacity, strengthening regional air defense coverage, enhancing coordination with coalition partners, and preparing protective infrastructure become doubly important. Diplomacy, in this context, can act as a “strategic pause.”

However, this assumption has an important limitation: preparations for a large-scale operation are difficult to conceal entirely. Significant troop movements, changes in defensive system configurations, heightened alert levels, and logistical mobilization are usually detectable across various layers of intelligence monitoring. Therefore, the credibility of the “buying time” hypothesis for a major action depends on field evidence and observable indicators, not merely political signals.

Dilemma of a limited strike versus the doctrine of a broad response

Another decisive variable is the cost-benefit equation of a limited strike. When one side formally declares that it will respond to any limited attack with a broad response, the structure of the game changes. In such circumstances, the option of a “controlled, limited strike” shifts from a low-risk tool to a costly gamble. In deterrence logic, this represents a shift from linear deterrence to escalatory deterrence — where even a small action can trigger a large reaction.

For the United States, a limited strike is only meaningful if three conditions are met: the ability to contain the opponent’s response, reasonable confidence that the scope of conflict will remain limited, and a clear operational gain. If any of these conditions are in doubt, a limited action is not only non-deterrent but may itself become a trigger for escalation. In such an environment, a signal for negotiations is less a cover for attack and more a tool for reducing the risk of unintended conflict.

Role of legitimacy-building and the battle of narratives

The narrative-building function of diplomacy should not be overlooked. Announcing readiness for negotiations sends a multilayered message to domestic public opinion, foreign allies, and the opposing side. This message can aim to reinforce the image of a “responsible actor” while shifting the burden of stalemate onto the other party. If talks fail, the actor that previously signaled willingness to negotiate is in a stronger position to justify subsequent actions.

From this perspective, diplomacy can be part of the battle of narratives — a tool for shaping the perceptual environment before any field developments. In this case, the primary objective is not buying time for an attack, but buying legitimacy for pressure — pressure that may be economic, political, cyber, or security-related, and not necessarily military.

Two-sided game logic and an unstable equilibrium

If the behavior of both sides is framed in game-theory terms, the situation resembles a high-escalation-risk game in which any aggressive move can lead to a chain of escalating reactions. In such games, rational actors usually keep a “reassurance channel” open to prevent falling into a point of no return. Negotiations, even if they do not quickly lead to an agreement, can serve precisely this reassurance function.

The current equilibrium is unstable but manageable: mutual deterrence, mutual threats, and parallel diplomacy are all active simultaneously. Removing any one of these pillars increases the likelihood of sliding toward uncontrolled confrontation.

The hypothesis that a negotiation offer is being used to buy time for completing defensive and offensive preparations is theoretically plausible, but without sufficient operational evidence, it cannot be the dominant assumption. By contrast, the weight of variables such as mutual deterrence, escalation risk, and uncertainty over the gains of a limited strike strengthens the scenario in which diplomacy is used as a tool for risk control and tension management. In an environment where the cost of miscalculation is extremely high, negotiations function less as a prelude to war and more as insurance against unintended war.

Washington’s announcement of readiness to negotiate with Tehran is therefore not merely a simple diplomatic message. This signal may serve both as a tool to contain tensions and as part of a timing game for recalibrating the balance of power. The central question remains: has the negotiating table been activated to push war further away, or to pursue a pressure scenario with greater preparedness?