Nournews: For decades, the United States has employed aircraft carriers as symbols of military supremacy and as a primary instrument of psychological warfare. These massive vessels are not merely weapons; they are an integral part of America’s power narrative—a narrative that seeks to convey the idea that wherever a U.S. aircraft carrier appears, the outcome of war is predetermined. Media emphasis on the capabilities of these platforms simultaneously serves two objectives: instilling fear in the adversary and imposing the assumption that no effective means exist to counter them.
This same pattern has re-emerged in the recent crisis between Iran and the United States. The persistent focus by American media outlets and officials on the presence of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in the region, along with similar assets reportedly en route, represents a familiar effort to project decisive superiority and to prepare public opinion for a policy of maximum pressure. The problem, however, is that this narrative is rooted more in imagery inherited from the classical wars of the twentieth century than in the realities of today’s battlefield. The dynamics of naval warfare—particularly in constrained and complex environments such as the Persian Gulf—have undergone a fundamental transformation.
Iran, standing in contrast to this narrative, has accumulated a unique body of experience—from the eight-year war with Iraq to decades of comprehensive economic and military sanctions. This accumulated experience has led Tehran to conclude that reliance on costly, classical models of power is neither feasible nor desirable. The result of this strategic understanding has been the formulation of an innovative defense doctrine focused on precise threat perception, intelligent use of national capabilities, and the conversion of limitations into advantages. This doctrine finds its meaning not in displays of power, but in the real capacity to respond and to impose costs on an aggressor.
The effectiveness of this approach has not remained merely theoretical. The recent 12-day war served as a practical demonstration of this strategy against two heavily armed nuclear powers. The combination of drones, missiles, electronic warfare, and a decentralized command-and-control network drew the attention of military analysts both domestically and internationally. Many observers explicitly acknowledged the “penetrating” and “effective” nature of this model—one that showed superiority does not necessarily stem from larger and more expensive equipment, but from how capabilities are organized and employed.
One significant piece of evidence supporting this reality is the replication of Iran’s Shahed-136 drone by Russia, the United States, and China—three powers that rank among the world’s most dominant military actors. This development clearly demonstrates that Iran’s defensive innovations are not only indigenous and effective, but also influential. When major powers turn to Iranian models, the notion of “absolute asymmetry” on the battlefield can no longer be sustained.
The same logic applies in the maritime domain. The fast-attack craft strategy, whose roots trace back to the years of the Iran–Iraq War, is based on enhanced mobility, agility, maneuverability, reduced vulnerability, and the creation of surprise. Instead of focusing on building a single, heavy, and costly aircraft carrier, Iran has deployed and organized a set of equivalent capabilities across fast and agile vessels. Naval cruise missiles with varying ranges, subsurface torpedoes, radar and electronic warfare systems, high–rate-of-fire artillery, reconnaissance, combat and suicide drones, multipurpose quadcopters, air defense systems, stealthy and hard-to-detect midget submarines, and suicide fast boats are all integrated into the offensive order of battle of the IRGC Navy’s flotillas.
In addition, these naval units are simultaneously supported by heavy coastal anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and a network of heavy combat drones providing fire support. The result is a force structure that, due to the multiplicity and dispersion of its units, possesses an operational capacity equivalent to several aircraft carriers—without bearing the inherent limitations of massive platforms, such as large size, restricted mobility, and high vulnerability within the confined geography of the Persian Gulf. This structure is precisely tailored to Iran’s maritime defense doctrine in narrow waterways and offers a high degree of surprise.
By this definition, Iran today effectively possesses several “aircraft carriers” in the region—carriers that are asymmetric, dispersed, low-cost, and minimally vulnerable. The presence of highly trained forces intimately familiar with the region’s geography further multiplies this capability. Under such conditions, psychological warfare based on showcasing American aircraft carriers not only lacks its former effectiveness, but may even backfire on its designers. As Iran’s senior military officials have repeatedly emphasized, the accumulation of equipment does not necessarily guarantee success; at times, such accumulation merely means an increase in the number of available targets.