Nournews: Iran’s latest foreign and security initiatives cannot be viewed merely as a collection of diplomatic visits and ad hoc positions. What is taking shape is a multi-tiered arrangement designed to manage risk, deterrence, and communication channels at the same time—an arrangement in which formal diplomacy, regional channels, strategic backstops, and targeted media messaging work in coordination to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation by the other side and to prevent the loss of initiative.

At the operational level of diplomacy, the foreign minister’s trip to Turkey should be seen as part of activating low-cost communication pathways. At this juncture, Turkey is playing the role of a “thermal intermediary”—a conduit for message delivery, intent-testing, and keeping lines of contact open without entering a formal negotiation framework. Such moves are aimed less at producing an immediate agreement than at preventing a complete freeze in relations. In other words, even at the height of tension, Tehran is seeking to preserve the ability to hear and be heard.

In parallel, the possible activation of Doha’s channels fits within the same logic. Over recent years, Qatar has demonstrated its utility in conveying sensitive messages, handling financial issues, and managing behind-the-scenes arrangements. In a high-tension environment, such a channel functions as a shock absorber—both for transmitting urgent messages and for regional reassurance, particularly regarding the non-use of neighboring territories against Iran. This layer of activity is part of the engineering of the crisis’s surrounding environment.

At the strategic level, the visit of the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council to Russia carries a different message. This type of consultation falls within the realm of political backing and international balancing. By keeping this channel active, Tehran signals that in the face of potential Western pressure, it retains a network of effective relationships and alternative options. This message directly shapes the other side’s calculations about Iran’s level of isolation or strategic room for maneuver.

Yet a crucial part of this configuration is not confined to travel alone; it is also evident in the layer of strategic messaging. Recent remarks by Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Supreme Leader’s representative on the Defense Council, stating that any attack could prompt an Iranian response targeting Israel, are not mere media posturing. They constitute a component of perceptual deterrence, articulated by a figure influential in shaping Iran’s defense strategies. This framing shifts the scope of response from a limited reaction to a geographically expandable one, thereby increasing uncertainty for planners contemplating a limited strike.

Indeed, when it is declared that any military action could trigger a response beyond the immediate theater of conflict and against Israeli targets, the notion of a “low-cost strike” loses its psychological credibility. This aligns precisely with Tehran’s core strategy: closing off the illusion of limited action. Here, deterrence is built not only with weapons, but by defining the breadth of response. By articulating these positions, Shamkhani underscored that Iran’s reaction ceiling is intended to be broad—and deliberately ambiguous—complicating the adversary’s cost-benefit calculations.

The simultaneity of these messages with joint naval drills with China and Russia, as well as recent missile displays, indicates that the rhetorical and operational layers are designed in tandem. Diplomatic, security, and military messages all convey the same theme: negotiation is possible, but only under the shadow of balance and deterrence, not unilateral threat.

The overall strategy can be described as “controlling the game before the game begins.” Tehran is seeking to slow the pace of developments, multiply communication options, keep international backstops active, and—through explicit deterrent signals, including the threat of expanding the scope of response against Israel—raise the perceived cost of any military action in the rival’s mind.

Within this framework, trips, regional channels, and Shamkhani’s targeted actions are not isolated elements; they are components of a single design aimed at shaping the decision-making environment before a costly decision is taken.