Shifts in concepts and realities are among the most defining features of today’s world. Many phenomena can be identified whose contemporary understanding differs fundamentally from how they were previously perceived. The scope of these changes is vast, but one of the most significant examples is the transformation in the definition and function of war. In the classical literature of international relations, war is often associated with bullets, firepower, and armies. In contemporary conflicts, however—especially in the U.S. confrontation with Iran—war is perceptual and social before it is military. This does not deny the military dimension of war; rather, it draws attention to the profound changes that have occurred in the nature of modern warfare. Recognizing this shift can lead to a redefinition of both the type and level of defense against an adversary.

Creating, Stimulating, and Redirecting Demand

What is currently unfolding in U.S. policy toward Iran can, drawing on economic concepts, be described as a form of “stimulating political demand”—a strategy aimed not merely at pressuring the state, but at reshaping societal demands and generating and intensifying radical political claims. In economics, demand stimulation refers to steering consumer behavior through incentives, advertising, or intervention in expectations. In U.S. policy toward Iran, we see a similar phenomenon: a systematic effort to redirect public demands from the economic sphere to the political one.

In recent years, a substantial portion of Iranian society’s demands have been economic and livelihood-related: inflation, employment, welfare, distributive justice, and improved quality of life. These demands, though serious and accumulated, are inherently reformist and manageable within the framework of the nation-state. The U.S. strategy, however, focuses precisely on the opposite. It seeks to elevate economic demands from the level of “improving conditions” to that of “transforming the political structure.” In other words, the objective is not to resolve Iran’s economic crisis, but to politicize economic dissatisfaction and convert it into an acute, radical, and high-cost demand—namely, regime change. Overt U.S. interventions in the unrest of January and similar episodes can be understood within this framework. From media and diplomatic support to psychological operations on social networks, all serve a single goal: redefining the issue in the minds of Iranian society in the way Washington prefers.

Within this narrative construction, economic problems are presented not as the result of specific policies, sanctions, or managerial weaknesses, but as consequences of the “nature of the political system.” The outcome of such framing is obvious. If the root of the problem is “structural,” then the solution is not reform, but radical change. This is precisely the point at which social demand is steered away from a rational, national claim toward a radical, zero-sum demand.

Stimulating Political Demand as a Prelude to War

“Stimulating political demand” is not merely a media tactic; it should be understood as a prelude and preparatory stage of war. No modern war begins without preparing the public opinion of the target society. In this model, before any missile is launched, minds must be convinced that the existing situation is “intolerable,” “irreformable,” and “without endogenous solutions.” Once the dominant demand of society is directed toward an acute political claim, the target country enters a phase of chronic instability—one in which any external pressure can trigger an internal explosion. From this perspective, stimulating political demand is not a substitute for war, but its enabler and justification.

The primary tool of this strategy is narrative warfare. The United States seeks to shift the dominant narrative about Iran from “a country with solvable problems” to “a country at a dead end.” In this narrative, sanctions are portrayed not as instruments of external pressure, but as the “moral response of the international community”; unrest is depicted not as a complex social phenomenon, but as a “final uprising”; and any call for reform, dialogue, or social repair is framed as “wasting time” or “collaborating with the status quo.” This narrative construction is precisely where U.S. foreign policy becomes intertwined with the psychology of Iranian society.

In the face of such a strategy, purely security-based or media responses are insufficient. The most important countermeasure is the intelligent management of social demand at home. A society that feels its economic and social demands are being acknowledged, that channels of dialogue are open, and that genuine reform is possible, is less susceptible to having its demands steered toward radical prescriptions. From this standpoint, emphasizing the healing of social trauma, engaging in dialogue with diverse social groups, avoiding coercive approaches, and acknowledging internal shortcomings are not merely social or ethical policies; they are integral components of a national defense strategy against hybrid warfare.

U.S. policy toward Iran must therefore be understood as something beyond sanctions and military threats. What is underway is a deliberate effort to reengineer political demand within Iranian society—to shift dissatisfaction from a reformable level to an overthrow-oriented one. Labeling this strategy as “stimulating political demand” helps clarify the true nature of the ongoing conflict. This is a war that begins not on the military battlefield, but in the realm of perception and demand. Under such conditions, preserving and strengthening social capital, rebuilding public trust, and offering realistic horizons for improvement are not only domestic necessities, but strategic barriers against a project whose ultimate aim is to weaken national cohesion and prepare the ground for more costly confrontations.

Accordingly, any resistance to internal reforms, or any attempt to portray Iran’s political system as irreformable, amounts to a wartime action against national interests. Any platform or microphone—domestic or foreign—that seeks to present the existing structure as incapable of reform clearly falls within the framework of the “stimulating political demand” strategy. Well-wishers of this land have for years called on all to pursue internal reforms at every level, presenting this path as the guarantor of domestic satisfaction, safety, and resilience against foreign intervention. A return to this approach is a national necessity.