Nournews: Yet what receives far less attention in the public sphere is the deep gap between political–media hype and the more sober, realist assessments offered by seasoned intelligence and security experts within the United States and Israel themselves.

These assessments highlight a range of structural, operational, and strategic challenges and present a far more cautious picture of both the feasibility and the consequences of such an action.

A significant number of American and Israeli security and military experts argue that one of the first major obstacles to military action lies in a flawed perception of Iran’s internal social and security conditions. The recent unrest in Iran—remarkable for its level of violence, the simultaneous use of cold and firearms, and the direct targeting of law enforcement and security forces—served as an important test case for Western intelligence circles. Contrary to the expectations of some political actors, the outcome of this test demonstrated that Iran’s security apparatus possesses the capacity to manage complex, multilayered crises and to maintain control under intense pressure. This experience has weakened the assumption that external pressure or military action would necessarily lead to internal collapse or sustained instability.

Within this framework, security assessments also stress the absence of a well-organized, coherent opposition with a meaningful social base—a critical gap in any intervention scenario. From the perspective of these experts, even the most severe military pressure, in the absence of a credible domestic actor capable of managing a transition of power, would likely result only in short-term instability or, paradoxically, in strengthened internal cohesion, rather than the strategic change anticipated by the architects of an attack.

Another key challenge stems from exaggerated interpretations of the effects of past limited confrontations. The experience of the so-called “12-day war” features prominently in current calculations. Contrary to propagandistic narratives that portray it as a successful and repeatable model, intelligence analyses in the U.S. and Israel suggest that this episode revealed less about Iran’s structural weakness and more about the limits of strategic surprise and Tehran’s capacity for rapid adaptation. In particular, analysts emphasize that in any repetition of such scenarios, the element of surprise would be minimal, and Iran would enter the confrontation with a significantly higher level of operational readiness.

At the same time, these assessments underscore the institutionalized and networked nature of decision-making in Iran. The assumption that Iran’s overall behavior or strategic trajectory could be altered through the elimination of a single individual or the infliction of a limited military blow is, in the view of experienced security experts, a dangerously simplistic notion. Past experience indicates that Iran’s political and security system is capable of absorbing shocks, regenerating cohesion, and maintaining strategic continuity—even under severe external pressure.

Equally significant is the concern over unintended consequences. Within Western intelligence circles, there is growing anxiety that a military strike could push Iranian decision-makers toward options that fall outside predictable patterns, expanding the scope of Iran’s response beyond controlled frameworks. This risk is particularly acute in a context of increased U.S. military presence and hardware in the region, where the danger of chain reactions and crisis escalation rises sharply.

The cumulative conclusion of these analyses points to a fundamental strategic reality: initiating a conflict with Iran is far easier than bringing it to an end. Military action, rather than undermining domestic legitimacy, could facilitate the mobilization of public support under the banner of “national defense” and temporarily bridge social divisions. From the perspective of seasoned American and Israeli intelligence and security experts, Iran represents a fundamentally different case from other security challenges Washington has faced—one that turns any hasty military move into a costly, high-risk gamble with uncertain and potentially far-reaching consequences.