Official year-on-year inflation data for Azar show that the inflation gap between provinces has not narrowed; on the contrary, it has widened to an alarming degree. The national average has reached 52%—a figure that on its own signals intense pressure on household livelihoods. Yet the provincial breakdown offers a clearer picture of the depth of the crisis.

At the top of the table, Semnan posted a record 62% inflation rate. It is followed by Kurdistan at 61% and Markazi at 60%. Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, North Khorasan and Khuzestan are clustered close to 59%, meaning that a large part of the country is experiencing inflation well above the national average. According to these figures, 28 of Iran’s provinces have recorded inflation of more than 50%—evidence of a nationwide phenomenon rather than a problem confined to a few isolated areas.

In the middle of the table are provinces such as Fars, Yazd, Sistan and Baluchestan, West Azerbaijan and Razavi Khorasan, with inflation rates between 55% and 57%. These are populous provinces with significant roles in production, agriculture and services, where persistent inflation could trigger knock-on disruptions across the national economy. Even the relatively better-off northern provinces, including Mazandaran and Gilan, have not been spared the inflationary wave.

Perhaps the most notable—and to some extent unexpected—finding is that Tehran recorded the lowest year-on-year inflation, at around 45%. This is the first time the capital has fallen to the bottom of the national inflation ranking. After Tehran, Kerman and South Khorasan are among the lowest-inflation provinces. The gap may reflect tighter oversight, differences in market structure, better access to goods and services, or even the short-term effects of price-control policies in the capital. It does not, however, signal any real improvement in living standards: inflation of 45% remains extremely high.

Beyond the provincial figures, the roots of this runaway inflation lie in deeper structural factors. One key driver has been changes in the oil ministry’s marketing and sales policies. According to multiple reports, these shifts have led to a sharp drop in oil sales and the loss of a substantial share of Iran’s export markets. International reports suggest that around 100 million barrels of Iranian oil are currently floating unsold—a development that has directly reduced the country’s foreign-currency earnings.

Compounding the problem are disclosures by some MPs regarding the performance of oil-sales trusts. According to these claims, part of the foreign currency generated by oil exports has either failed to return to the country or has been subject to so-called “phantom reporting”. This has effectively shrunk the economy’s real foreign-exchange resources and contributed to an unprecedented currency crisis. The inevitable result has been pressure on the exchange rate, higher import costs and, ultimately, the transmission of price shocks to household consumption across the country.

Taken together, these factors show that the current inflation is neither a statistical anomaly nor a temporary spike. It is the product of the interaction between currency policy, oil-sector management and weak oversight. Without serious reform of oil-sales structures, greater transparency in foreign-exchange flows and a rebuilding of trust in economic policymaking, bringing this broad-based provincial inflation under control will become increasingly difficult.