December 18 was designated—at the initiative of the Islamic Republic of Iran and with the approval of the United Nations General Assembly—as the International Day of a World against Violence and Extremism. This initiative, launched in 2013, at the height of global concern over the spread of sectarian extremism, organized terrorism, and groups such as ISIS, carried profound meaning and historical urgency. At that time, the prevailing assumption was that the principal and dominant threat to global peace emanated from non-state actors, radical ideological networks, and armed movements operating outside the framework and direct will of states. Yet twelve years on, the world confronts a different reality—one that shows violence and extremism have neither disappeared nor necessarily weakened, but have merely been “relocated.”

Shift of Terrorism from Groups to States

Today, even as groups such as ISIS have been severely constrained in territorial and organizational terms, new forms of violence are being normalized—violence exercised not on the margins of the international order, but at its very core, and by states themselves. What has taken place and continues to take place in Gaza over the past two years, what occurred during the 12-day war carried out by the United States and Israel against Iran, and what is enforced through crippling blockades and sanctions against countries such as Venezuela, are all examples of blatant state violence and overt extremism. This violence is justified in the language of law, security, or national interest, yet in substance it differs little from the very violence that was previously condemned.

The central problem here is a kind of conceptual vacuum. The international system continues to assess violence largely through the criterion of “non-state” action. Terrorism, extremism, and radicalism are concepts most often used to describe actors operating outside state frameworks. By contrast, when the same behavioral patterns—namely the disproportionate use of force, collective punishment, the systematic elimination of civilians, or the exertion of maximum pressure on the everyday lives of people—are carried out by states, they are typically redefined under labels such as “self-defense,” “deterrence,” or “decisive foreign policy.”

This dual standard is deeply problematic from the perspective of political philosophy and international ethics. If violence is reduced solely to the identity of its perpetrator rather than its nature and consequences, states effectively enjoy a form of moral immunity. In such a condition, extremism functions not as a pattern of action, but as a “political label”—one affixed exclusively to the enemies of the dominant order.

Courage to Rethink

Rethinking the concept of violence requires moving beyond this actor-centered view toward an action-centered definition. Violence, whether committed by a paramilitary group or by a state holding a seat at the United Nations, is violence when it violates human dignity, turns civilian life into a tool of pressure, and legitimizes collective suffering as a means of political conduct. In this sense, the widespread bombing of residential areas or the systematic deprivation of a nation’s access to medicine, food, and vital services is not fundamentally different from classical extremism; the only distinction lies in “institutional legitimacy.”

From the standpoint of critical theories of international relations, this condition signals a moral crisis in the global order. When international law is applied selectively and human rights standards are subordinated to power balances, state violence is not only left unchecked but becomes a reproducible model. The outcome of such a process is the gradual erosion of global trust in concepts such as justice, human rights, and even peace itself.

If the International Day of a World against Violence and Extremism is to retain meaning, it requires conceptual updating. Extremism today does not necessarily appear with black flags or ideological manifestos; at times it is presented in diplomatic suits, unilateral resolutions, and security doctrines. The world, more than ever, needs the moral courage to rename violence—a courage that can acknowledge that states, too, can be extremist.

Ultimately, redefining violence and extremism is not an abstract academic debate, but a condition for the survival and credibility of the international order. If violence is condemned only when perpetrated by “others,” the concept is reduced to a political instrument. But if the criterion is human suffering and the violation of dignity—regardless of the identity of the actor—then perhaps there remains hope for a world free from violence, not merely in rhetoric, but in meaning.