The resolution advanced by the three European countries with U.S. support was built from the outset on a major omission: ignoring the military attack on Iran’s safeguarded facilities. The Agency Director-General’s official report also confirms that the suspension of some verification activities was directly and unequivocally a consequence of the bombings. Nevertheless, the resolution’s text does not contain even a minimal reference to these attacks—as if the world had not witnessed one of the most blatant examples of “bombing safeguarded nuclear infrastructure.”

Such an approach is not a technical error but a political choice: turning safeguards into a tool of pressure and neutralizing the aggressors’ responsibilities. This is precisely what analysts call a “fundamental inversion in the oversight mechanism”: the victim must answer, and the attacker becomes the claimant.

Accusing the Victim: Ignored Security Framework

Following the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Fordow and Natanz, Iran—like any other country in the world—adjusted its level of cooperation with the Agency. National security is the first condition for the continuation of safeguards cooperation. But the new resolution ignores this obvious consideration and, in a deliberately one-sided manner, presents Iran as responsible for any halt or change in the monitoring process.

In effect, the resolution completely reverses the narrative:

The disruptor is the United States; yet Iran is presented as the accused.
Iran’s facilities were the target of attack; yet responsibility for the increased risk is presumed to lie with Tehran.

The agency itself admits that monitoring operations faced constraints after the attacks; yet in the European–American text, these constraints are labeled as the product of “Iran’s non-compliance.”

This behavior goes beyond a technical disagreement and enters the level of “manipulating truth to advance a political agenda.”

Return of Snapback Shadow: Europe in Pressure Orbit

The three European countries that today, with numerical dominance at the Board of Governors, are driving this resolution are the same states that have systematically violated their JCPOA commitments over the past seven years. Now, by repeating the snapback formula—but this time in the form of a safeguards resolution—the Europeans are attempting to revive a legally defunct pathway.

The emphasis on a “complete suspension of enrichment”—even research and development—although reminiscent in wording of the old UN Security Council resolutions, is in practice an explicit attempt to restore terminated resolutions. This effort not only lacks legal authority, but if established, will subject the entire non-proliferation regime to a crisis of confidence.

In pursuing this path, Europe has overlooked a key point: by participating in intelligence-sharing for the Khordad 1404 (June 2025) attack and operationally aligning itself with the U.S. pressure policy, it has moved from the position of “mediator” to that of a “party to the conflict,” and its current demands therefore lack political legitimacy.

Tehran’s Message: Conditional Cooperation, Not Cooperation Under Pressure and Threat

Over recent months, despite the attacks and the inaction of Western parties, Iran kept the path of engagement with the Agency open and even officially signed a new cooperation protocol on 9 September. But U.S. and European political pressure at the Board of Governors halted this process.

The announcement of the termination of the 9 September understanding and the expiration of the Cairo understanding carries a clear meaning:

Tehran demonstrated that its adherence to technical cooperation is contingent on mutual respect, not on an atmosphere of threats.

Nevertheless, Iran has repeatedly emphasized that safeguards—as a legal obligation—will continue as usual; however, any additional steps or complementary arrangements no longer have standing after the latest resolution. This position is not an emotional reaction but the reflection of a strategic calculation: one cannot simultaneously be the target of bombings and be expected to maintain unconditional transparency.