The UN Security Council voted in a critical session on a resolution proposed by Russia and China to postpone the reimposition of UN sanctions against Iran for six months; a resolution that was ultimately not approved with 4 votes in favor, 9 against, and 2 abstentions, effectively ending the process of activating the so-called “trigger” mechanism.

The action of the three European countries in activating the snapback has neither a legal basis nor political validity, and as the Iranian officials have said, the new agreement reached between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Cairo to cooperate under the new conditions will be lost when the snapback mechanism is implemented. The US violated Resolution 2231 in 2018 by unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA, and Europe also violated its obligations by complying with Washington’s illegal sanctions.

Regarding possible scenarios in the post-snapback era, despite the re-imposition of the terminated UN sanctions, Iran can continue to cooperate with its international partners through active diplomacy and neutralize the negative effects of sanctions by relying on unanimity with China, Russia, and other allies. The fact is that the European Troika's action is an exceptional phenomenon from the perspective of international law and even contradicts the spirit of the UN Charter. According to the UN Charter, an agreement between major powers must be reached by consensus, but given that the snapback initiative has faced opposition from China and Russia, the resolutions certainly have little validity, and the obligation to implement them for other countries is weakened.

At this point, the door to diplomacy is still open for Iran, and it should also establish active diplomatic relations with its partners, such as China, Russia, India, ASEAN countries, and Africa, to prevent the international community from agreeing with the restrictions resulting from the six returned resolutions. Of course, the return of the resolutions is mostly symbolic, and major countries such as Russia and China will not practically agree with the West regarding the restrictions, because the national interests of the countries take precedence over everything else. China is Iran's largest economic partner, and Russia is in almost the same situation. Some countries, including India, have recently intended to resume oil imports from Iran, and Iran has high oil and trade capacities that cannot be ignored. I believe that the Russians, the Chinese, and some other countries that cooperated with Iran will continue their relations with Iran, perhaps even on a larger scale. Of course, due to UN pressure, information about cooperation may be limited. One of the tasks of diplomacy and diplomats is to define benefits for other countries so that they are also encouraged to cooperate with Iran. Therefore, if other countries feel that their interests are not being served by the implementation of these resolutions against Iran, they will not comply.

Regarding the US and European sanctions, it must be admitted that the US sanctions are more effective than the UN sanctions, and the restrictions on Iran's nuclear programs by the six previous resolutions are more of an arms and nuclear nature.

One possible practical scenario would be Iran's non-cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, because in the understanding reached between Tehran and the safeguards body hosted by Cairo, Iran's cooperation with the Agency was supposed to end if the snapback mechanism was activated. Naturally, with the return of sanctions, Tehran will not provide the Agency with information about the country's nuclear facilities, and it will not accept monitoring of peaceful active sites. This will be considered a failure from the point of view of Europe, the United States, and the Zionist regime, which are desperately seeking Iranian nuclear information, because this information would be used for hostile actions against the country.

In fact, it seems that the main victims of the return of sanctions will be Europe and the United States. Let us remember that at the time of the ratification of the JCPOA, Iran accepted an enrichment limit of 3.67 percent, and if Donald Trump had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran would not have implemented 20 percent enrichment. From another perspective, it should be noted that the Europeans also did not fulfill their commitments, and enrichment reached 60 percent. Therefore, when the other side adopts hostile positions, Iran, ignoring them, continues to accelerate its industrial and scientific development. Managing sanctions is difficult, but not impossible. Iran has overcome them before, and it will overcome them today.