News ID : 58862
Publish Date : 2/3/2021 1:19:11 AM
Iran and Taliban

BY: Abdullah Ganji

Iran and Taliban

What matters to the Islamic Republic today is ISIS’s geographical shift from the Arab world to Afghanistan. The existence of ISIS in Afghanistan is much harder for us than being in Syria and Iraq, because they have two relative advantages in this country, first the Persian language and the second is the high volume of traffic across the eastern border of Iran and the difficulty of controlling the entrance. Is Iran seeing the Taliban as the opposite of the ISIS threat? If such an art exists, it is commendable.

NOURNEWS - The official presence of the Taliban delegation in Tehran left many questions and reasons among the country's elites and politicians that were not properly answered. People should not think that the image that the government and the media have painted of the Taliban for the past 26 years is different from the image that the government itself has about this group.

It may be previous imagination that has made it hard to interpret the present-day face of the Taliban, and the interpretation and turbidity of the image remains, but it is necessary for the Supreme National Security Council and the Foreign Ministry to explain to the people about the pathology of presenting yesterday's image and today's situation, and if it has any connection with this group for the national interests of us or the Shiites of Afghanistan, tell the nation and not remain silent solely for being accused of links to a terrorist group.

The reason for the connection is important if it weren't for the U.S. not negotiating with the group for a few years. Even westerners were very keen to negotiate with ISIS and al-Qaeda, but they seemingly did, and the main reason is the lack of belief in international law and the government-country category.

But there are multiple questions in the minds of our nation about the Taliban that I explain as far as I understand or have information.

Questions generally revolve around the martyrdom of an Iranian diplomats in Mazar-Sharif and the martyrdom of Afghan Shiites. The belief was reinforced when Iran made military arrangements on the country's eastern border, but the leadership warned the armed forces against invading Afghanistan and the Taliban.

Whether the leadership had received any different information or not, we are not aware, but the author believes that the Afghan Taliban did not play a role in the testimony of Iranian diplomats, and the Islamic Republic also believed that the assassination of those loved ones was in coordination with the intelligence system of a third country.

As for the martyrdom of The Shiites of Afghanistan, if the art of the Islamic Republic is to commit the Taliban to the sanctity of Shia blood, it is commendable. Of course, the Taliban has also stated many times that they are committed to the sanctity of Shiite blood, but they claim that when they attack somewhere and someone resists, they will get involved, and it doesn't matter whether they are Shia or Sunni, but they don't accept going after someone just because they're Shia.

The attack on the Shiite-dominated area west of Kabul in the winter of 1994 and entering Kabul from that point and the martyrdom of Abdul Ali Mazari or the attack on Bamyan province, which led to the issuance of a statement of appeal by the Supreme Leader, may have been the kind that was aimed at seizing the land and the martyrdom of Shiites was due to resistance, not accusations of takfir.

Of course, this does not mean that we justify the same measures as confirming and seizing people's homes and houses, but it is possible to understand that terror and martyrdom were not due to the element of takfir. Unlike ISIS and al-Qaeda, the Taliban negotiate, suggesting that it believes in power-seeking in the geography of Afghanistan (not the Muslim world) or a partnership in power there, otherwise it would not have negotiated.

What matters to the Islamic Republic today is ISIS’s geographical shift from the Arab world to Afghanistan. The existence of SISI in Afghanistan is much harder for us than being in Syria and Iraq, because they have two relative advantages in this country, first the Persian language and the second is the high volume of traffic across the eastern border of Iran and the difficulty of controlling the entrance. Is Iran seeing the Taliban as the opposite of the ISIS threat? If such an art exists, it is commendable.

The Taliban's insecure U.S. presence in Afghanistan is a matter for Iran. The expulsion of the United States from Afghanistan was the cause of General Qasem martyrdom, and if the Taliban end this important issue, our national interests and security have also been secured.

Of course, the Taliban may have goals that we do not accept, but if the connection with them destroys ISIS, ensures the health of Shiites and takes a comfortable sleep away from the Americans, communication is needed and the government should leave it open.

The presence of Taliban representatives in Iran should not be considered merely as a deterrent to the United States or that we also have a base in Afghanistan. If communication with the Taliban is in accordance with our national interests and that of The Shiites of Afghanistan, we must be held accountable for the past 27 years.

Perhaps there was no connection since the Taliban's birth, and in recent years, communication has been made possible. This should be explained to the people, and of course the Taliban should know that if it seeks power in the way of violence, it will never be supported by Iran.


Javan Newspaper
Comments

first name & last name

email

comment